

CHAPTER 5

A GENETIC-HISTORICAL STUDY OF DOOYEWEERD'S LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

First of all it would be helpful to put together some of the more emphatic stresses and lines of development in Dooyeweerd's thinking so that our reconstruction will be better understood.

From the beginning Dooyeweerd saw that historicism was a tremendous foe of reformational thinking and life.¹ In particular, he felt that the thinking of the leaders of the Anti-revolutionary Party had capitulated to a modified historicism. In many places and in different connections we see his critique of Groen van Prinster and especially Stahl.² Another

1. Dooyeweerd, "Het vraagstuk der gemeentemonopolies in het belang der volksgezondheid, hoofdzakelijk beschouwd in het licht van de nieuwe opvattingen in zake de bedrijfsvrijheid," Themis, LXXI (1920), pp. 126-151. Dooyeweerd, "Het Calvinistisch beginsel der soevereiniteit in eigen kring als staatkundig beginsel," Nederland en Oranje, IV (1923), pp. 98-99, 185-189; V (1924), pp. 8-15, 27-31, 71-76. In these two articles the enemy is Socialism, but the features of historicism are present. Later he goes deeper into the historic basis of the "general welfare" cultural state. In Calvinisme en Natuurrecht (Amersfoort, W. van Wijngen, 1925), Dooyeweerd shows a clear awareness of historicism especially as it relates to Stahl. In "Tweërlei kritiek," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, II (1926), pp. 12-13, he speaks of anti-revolution and relativism. See also Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1926), pp. 12-46; "De universaliteit der rechtsgedachte en de idee van den kultuurstaat," Almanak van het Studentencorps aan de Vrije Universiteit (Amsterdam: 1928); "De zin der geschiedenis vanuit de openbaring," Vox Theologica, V/5 (1934); De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 1931), pp. 111-136.
2. For Dooyeweerd's critique of Stahl see Calvinisme en Natuurrecht; De Zin der Geschiedenis en de 'Leiding Gods' in de Historische Ontwikkeling (Publicaties van de Reunisten - Organisatie van N.D.D.D., V, 1932); "De universaliteit der rechtsgedachte en de idee van den cultuurstaat," also, "Leugen en waarheid over het Calvinisme," Nederland en Oranje, VI (1925), pp. 81-90.

stress relating to historicism is Dooyeweerd's evaluation of the importance of Von Savigny in the German historical wing of law. Especially when the historical school focused on the problem of positive law, legal forming, sources of law, historical foundation of the state, etc., and relativized structural law, Dooyeweerd felt compelled to give a broad foundation, systematics, and critique of these problems.³

Dooyeweerd has great natural ability to live into others' positions and he believes that critique involves accounting for the traces of truth in another's position in terms of one's positive systematics as well as explaining why the position falls into absolutizations and wrong stresses both at the level of ground-motive, theoretic presuppositions, and details. Dooyeweerd did not drop the problem of historicism, but one finds an increasing stress on the working out of the systematics of the historical aspects.⁴ Dooyeweerd's increasing stress on immanent and trans-

3. Dooyeweerd, "De bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde (driemaandelijksch orgaan), IV (1930), pp. 1-68. Here is the most extensive treatment of the historic school of law, especially pp. 36-73. See also "De theorie van de bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee," Handelingen van de Vereeniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts, XIX (1932-1933); Encyclopaedie van de Rechtswetenschap, vol. III, "De bronnen van het stellig recht," (Amsterdam: mimeo, 1962).

4. Some examples are: A New Critique, II, pp. 180-365; De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, II, pp. 126-300; Recht en Historie (Assen: G. F. Hummelen, 1938); "De zin der geschiedenis vanuit de openbaring;" "De vooronderstellingen van ons denken over recht en samenleving in de crisis van het moderne historisme," Themis, CX (1949), pp. 193-248; "Perikelen van een historistische rechtstheorie," Themis, CIV (1954), pp. 25-54; Wijsbegeerte en Geschiedenis, Referaat gehouden op de conferentie van de Organisatie van studenten in de geschiedenis in Nederland te Arnhem, 1957; Maatstaven ter onderkenning van Progressieve en Reactionaire Bewegingen in de Historische Ontwikkeling (Amsterdam: Noordhollandse Uitgeverijmaatschappij, 1958); Vernieuwing en Bezinning, pp. 39-110, 180-192, 240-280. See also critique on Groen van Prinster in Vernieuwing en Bezinning, pp. 240-280.

cedental critique as opposed to a transcendent critique and his emphasis on the philosophia perennis show the high sense of development of the element of fairness in theoretical thought (ethical anticipatory moment) and theoretical living into or empathy (inleving)(social anticipation or psychical retrocipation) which characterize Dooyeweerd from the beginning. His realization of his solidarity within the western thought-community underlies his sympathetic concern to do justice to the other's position as well as his grateful appreciation of the insights and discoveries of those before him and his passion to positively continue this development.

In this sense one can easily find the whole history of western thinking reflected in his work in a way which reminds one of Hegel. As a result of these gifts the problem of historicism was not dropped in emphasis until Dooyeweerd had worked out in detail his own systematics to counteract historicism. This partly explains the stress of Dooyeweerd's first publications on the importance of an idea of law, especially sphere-sovereignty as a cosmological corollary of this idea of law.⁵ It was over against irrationalistic historicism which relativized the law side and destroyed norm consciousness that Dooyeweerd asserted the necessity of an idea of law for giving the Calvinistic life-and-world view a unique style and unitive direction.⁶

This stress on the importance of the idea of law as central ground-hypothesis cannot wholly be explained by his recognition of the impending danger from the side of historicism. Just as important for his emphasis on the idea of law from the very beginning is his reaction against

5. See "Het Calvinistisch beginsel der souvereiniteit in eigen kring als staatkundig beginsel," Nederland en Oranje, IV (1923), pp. 98-99, 185-189, V (1924), pp. 8-15, 27-31, 71-76; "In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde;" Calvinisme en Natuurrecht, pp. 19-31; "De bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee."

6. See "In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde," pp. 7-10.

the mode of concept-forming found in the late rationalistic neo-Kantian movement.⁷ Dooyeweerd tried, particularly in his juridical theory, to overcome the generalizing, abstract character of norms in the rationalistic neo-Kantian legal theorists. Here he found a split between norm and fact, the lack of clear limits, fixing of terrains (terrein afbakening), the problem of causality, along with confusion in respect to the different kinds of causality, especially physical, juridical, and moral causality.⁸ In general, the necessity of pure concept formation, proper and critical restriction of use of terms, spur Dooyeweerd on to refine the meaning of norm and to spell out the importance of sphere sovereignty in the field of jurisprudence in terms of a law aspect.

The stress on the idea of law and particularly sphere sovereignty (although his emphasis on sphere universality is somewhat stressed even in his first writings)⁹ can only be properly understood, then, in his

7. References to neo-Kantianism are to be found in almost all of Dooyeweerd's publications. Some examples are: Calvinisme en Natuurrecht; "Calvinisme contra neo-Kantianisme," Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, XX (1926), pp. 29-74; De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie; "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee;" "Berepmissdaad en strafvergoeding in 't licht der wetsidee;" "De bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee;" "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee;" De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer; "Norm en feit," Themis, XCIII (1932), pp. 155-214 (this article has extended coverage of Kant and his significance for the United Nations idea); "De theorie van de bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee;" "Boekbespreking; Pes, Philosophie der Wetenschappen," Vox Theologica, XII (1941), pp. 85-90; "Bespreking; Kranenburg, De grondslagen der rechtswetenschap," Themis (1950), pp. 89-98; "Over de methode van begripvermaging in de rechtswetenschap," Themis (1953), pp. 298-340.
8. See "Het Calvinistische beginsel der souvereiniteit in eigen kring als staatkunde beginsel;" Calvinisme en Natuurrecht; "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee;" "Norm en feit;" "De medele structuur van het juridisch oorzakelijkheidsverband," Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, XIII/5 (1950).
9. See "Universaliteit der rechtsgedachte en de idee van den kultuurstaat."

reacting to historicism as well as neo-Kantianism.

It is very interesting in this connection to note that in a few areas Dooyeweerd's thought is still not developed at these early stages and, in particular, in noticeable respects: the stress on the unity of the subject side as being supra-temporal¹⁰ or in other words, the concentration point, his idea of cosmic time,¹¹ individuality structures,¹² and, tying in closely with the concentration point in its time transcending character, the transcendental critique.¹³ It does not take long for

10. On p. 169, footnote 68, of this dissertation I said that in "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen..." was the first appearance of Dooyeweerd's mature vision of time as a prism and supra-temporal in its customary application. It is there that the concentration point is formulated and the unity of the law spheres is not thought of as being solved by a direct appeal to the providential world plan as an organism of law spheres. Another of the first expressions is to be found in the article "De bronnen van het stellig recht..." This article also dates from 1930. In "De bronnen..." we also find the full vision. See pp. 10-13 for the prism idea and for the transcendent concentration point on the subject side in "onvergankelijken transcendent-religieuze wortel in het menschengeslacht, waarin de religieuze zin-volheid onzer schepping...." On p. 12 he refers to our individuality structure as unity of subject (subjectseenheid) although he has all the essential ingredients of this soon to appear in the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. Also on p. 12 is an interesting application of the term vergankelijk, in which it is applied to the whole cosmos, man excepted. He says, "All dingen, die een leidende functie in de kosmische werkelijkheid bezitten, zijn vergankelijk, begrensd tot het tijdelijke. De mensch heeft daarom als zodanig geen 'leidende functie'. Heel zijn activiteit in deze wereld wordt bepaald door zijn stellingname in den onvergankelijken, religieuzen, den kosmos transcendeerenden wortel zijner persoonlijkheid, 't zij in onderwerping aan God, 't zij in apostasie, in afval van zijn Schepper. Daarom is ieder vergankelijk ding begrensd door de souvereiniteit in eigen kring, doch de mensch als zodanig gaat onzen vergankelijken kosmos te boven."
11. See p. 169, footnote 68, of this dissertation.
12. For an undeveloped idea of individuality structure see "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," p. 36. For more fully developed comments of Dooyeweerd see De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer.
13. It seems clear that this transcendental critique does not really develop until he sees the idea of the transcendent root on the subject side and the prism idea as in the two articles mentioned in footnote 10 (above).

these points to come into the picture, so that by 1936 when the Dutch edition of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee appeared, all these points were present.¹⁴ On all these points there was further development but there needed to be a sharpening of the transcendental critique and a development of the systematics in respect to cosmic time.

The figure of the prism, so important to a synoptic picture of Dooyeweerd's systematics, occurs very early, but it is not related to cosmic time as a breaking law and the unity of the subject which then is refracted to its temporal function. It is restricted to its significance for the unity and diversity of law spheres or aspects.¹⁵ The diversity of law aspects in his early writings, before 1936, is not brought into direct relation to time as a breaking law with its breaking points in the modal nuclei, but rather to the organism of ordinances of the creation plan.¹⁶ There seems to be a more direct relation to the divine creation plan or counsel and the diversity of law spheres. This emphasis, however, does not last too long, as stated above.

Dooyeweerd's rediscovery of Kuyper's idea of the heart¹⁷ and with this the development of the centrality of religion as time-transcending

14. Dooyeweerd does not feel that his critique was sufficiently sharpened with the appearance of De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. See A New Critique, I, p. 34.

15. See p. 179, footnote 82, of this dissertation.

16. This need for unity was paramount for Dooyeweerd. For a few references before 1930, see "Vraag en antwoord," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, (driemaandelijksch orgaan) I (1927), p. 292; "Het oude probleem der Christelijk staatkunde," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, II (1926), pp. 64ff.; "Leugen en waarheid over het Calvinisme," p. 90; "De oorsprong van de anti-these tusschen Christelijke en humanistische wetsidee....," Anti-revolutionaire Staatskunde, (driemaandelijksch orgaan) I (1927), pp. 77ff., especially p. 88. This is a very important early systematic work; many of the problems discussed by us are already present in this article. It is also good for his evaluation of Augustine. See also "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee."

17. See A New Critique, I, "foreword," p. v.

or supra-temporal, coupled with a rediscovery of the creational, cosmic importance of τῆς as transcendental boundary function¹⁸ (grens-functie) comes in his struggle to overcome two extremely important problems for himself. Dooyeweerd saw from the very beginning that irrationalistic historicism and Lebensphilosophie (Bergson and Spengler)¹⁹ and rationalistic positivism and neo-Kantianism, could only be truly challenged if their common heritage in the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought was challenged. The importance of the time-transcending concentration point in overcoming the critical transcendental thinking of neo-Kantians with their dialectical polarity between subject and object with its consequent failure to overcome the anti-thetical relation of theoretical thought, and thus to arrive at synthesis, necessitated Dooyeweerd to find a point beyond the anti-thetical intentional relation of theoretical thought from which synthesis could be completed.²⁰ Because he already held to cosmic time as a breaking law which accounted for the basic genera of cosmic diversity and at the same time conceived of cosmic time as the principle of coherence (samenhang), as well as continuity between these aspects there was no room left for a concentration point within cosmic time. This concentration point, with its all-embracing diverse sovereign spheres, had to be sought beyond cosmic time.²¹

The inspiration for the supra-temporal time-transcending concentration point seemed to come from three directions simultaneously. In the first place, the immanence thinkers, upon whom Dooyeweerd was most de-

18. Dooyeweerd, De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, p. 95; also "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," p. 174.

19. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 160-162.

20. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, "Prolegomena." Also, "De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgeerig denken...." Phil. Ref., VI (1941), pp. 1-20.

21. Ibid.

pendent elevated their concentration points through their absolutizing of the analytical function in their dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought above the time horizon.²² It seems that it was via an immanent critique of these thinkers that he recognized the necessity of the concentration point being supra-temporal.²³ This he recognized as a state of affairs of the inner structure of theoretical thought itself. Dooyeweerd never challenges the necessity of the supra-temporal character of the concentration point in these thinkers, but rather, focuses on the diversity of their pretended starting points and discredits them as being various hypostatizations of modal aspects due to the dogma of autonomy, and therefore, as false supra-temporal concentration points.²⁴ He strongly clings to what he considers to be an undeniable state of affairs in these thinkers; if totality-oversight and also time-consciousness is to be gained, it cannot be gained within the cosmic temporal horizon which precisely has the signification of being a refraction law for the fullness, totality, and unity of meaning, unless one takes a point outside and above cosmic time. The necessity of the time-transcending character of any concentration point is an undeniable feature in all theoretical systems. Dooyeweerd thus attributes the fact that the transcendental consciousness, transcendental-cogito, transcendental-ego, homo-noumenon, the Aristotelian notion of substance, all had this supra-temporal character due to the inner nature of theoretical thought.²⁵

This insight into the facets of these non-Christian theoretical

22. Dooyeweerd, De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, pp. 84-117.

23. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immanentiestandpunt," pp. 66-69; also, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 175-181 (included here is an important footnote concerning aeivum).

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

systems was, secondly, not understandable without the awareness of Dooyeweerd's rediscovery of the heart in Kuyper. It is the particular character of Dooyeweerd that he felt that the integral radically scriptural character of this view of the heart was that it stood on the boundary between eternity and time at a point at which life was undifferentiated, comprehended, unified, and unrefracted. This nature of the heart on the boundary between eternity and time attracted Dooyeweerd's immediate attention. It gave him what he thought was the Christian answer to the state of affairs which were involved in the inner nature of theoretical thought itself and which had been constantly recognized by immanent thinking. It is interesting in this regard that Dooyeweerd does not accept this boundary character of heart in a strict Kuyperian sense. In Dooyeweerd's system the pistical law sphere as boundary sphere with its correlated subjective faith function, has mere the character of being on the boundary between time and eternity. The heart, religion, and the concentration point are given the status of being supra-temporal, that is, beyond or above the boundary, while the pistical points from the boundary to the concentration point beyond.

A third important impetus for conceiving of the concentration point as above cosmic time is the already-discussed problem of historicism. With religion as the supra-temporal sphere of occurrence distinguished sharply from the historical aspect of time, the domination of historicism could be broken. Dooyeweerd found a standing place for the selfhood elevated above the changing variable process of cosmic continuity and duration which had so pointedly and rightly been brought to the fore by historicism and a point of direction for the process of unfolding, positization, becoming of historical time, with its key norms of differen-

tiation, individualization, and integration.

With one stroke Dooyeweerd had found a central and all-controlling Archimedean point which enabled him to sharpen his transcendental critique and method, to unmask the autonomy of theoretical thought, to transcend the dilemma of historicism, and to give integral and radical expression to the reformational character of the problems of the unity of life in its meaning character.

With the discovery of this concentration point, which was always clearly present in Dooyeweerd, came new understanding of the Word of God in its integral, radical, re-forming central sense. Just as human life, and with it the temporal cosmos, had a radical, integral, unified center beyond cosmic time, so the Word of God could again be seen in its central redirecting sense as power ($\deltaύναμις$). The Word of God as central, integral, because of its supra-temporal, life-giving, re-creating, regenerating power, could again be seen. Word-revelation, ground-motive power, ground-motive driving force, the unifying key, could be brought into focus.

Dating from this development of his thinking concerning the supra-temporal character of the concentration point, we find Dooyeweerd developing his idea of central communal religious ground-motives as the directing powers in Western culture.²⁶ Along with this refinement of the apostate ground-motive with its dialectical character, comes the refinement of his expression of the reformational Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation. This development of the notion of ground-motives co-

26. Dooyeweerd, "De vier religieuze grondthema's in den ontwikkelingsgang van het wijsgeerig denken van het Avondland," *Phil. Ref.*, VI (1941), p. 161. Also, *Vernieuwing en Beginning, passim*; *Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte*, pp. 17-64.

incides with his sharpening of the transcendental critique of theoretical thought and the corresponding transcendental method which today is the dominating emphasis of his thought.

It would seem that the reason why this dominating emphasis has developed is that the rediscovery of the central ground-motive character of Word-revelation gave Dooyeweerd the fundamental insight into the way nature-grace thinking, especially as it was found in biblicism and scholastic theologians, could be overcome.

From his earliest development Dooyeweerd was unsatisfied with the biblicistic attempt of his teachers to find the Christian view of the state and jurisprudence in general. The relativity involved in theological exegesis of biblical texts, brought to the fore pointedly through historicism and higher critical theologians, the exaggeration of the proof-text method in appealing to Scripture, the rationalistic and objectivistic ways of conceiving of the Word of God as inscripturated, the use of Scripture involving problems of necessary inference, and the logicism in Reformed scholastic theology, all could be transcended, reformulated, and criticized now that the integral, radical, central supra-temporal sense of the Word of God had been rediscovered. The religious character of the ground-motive of Word was now seen as giving the unity to the diversity of scriptural books and themes and as the virtual key to knowledge.²⁷ The central religious character of the Word of God intends to make clear that man is driven to a central choice, a religious choice of position in the root unity of life. This meant immediately

27. Dooyeweerd, "Enkele losse grepen uit de discussie ter jaarvergadering, 1956," *Corr. bladen*, XX (June 1956), pp. 41-45.

28. Dooyeweerd, "De strijd om het schriftuurlijk karakter van de W.d.W.," *Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte* (Juli 1950), pp. 3-6.

that any subtle form of autonomy in theology could be unmasked and theology as a special science, and exegesis in general, could be seen to be dependent on a prior religious choice of position.

Thus biblicism, theologism, and nature-grace ground-motives were overcome. Positively, this meant that theoretical thought, both as philosophy as well as the special sciences, could be directed positively by the Word of God and be truly scriptural. Christian philosophy and theoretical thinking were possible.

It is important in this connection to remember that Kuyper had seen many of these same points, namely: the importance of regeneration and re-direction of life in the root, the stress on the heart as the root of men, the stress on the heart as concentration point (poen stou) for God's regeneration of the human race and the world, its boundary, partly supra-temporal character and the important discovery of the increased function of faith as distinguished from religion and the heart. On one central point Dooyeweerd made a correction on Kuyper which enabled him to re-structure Kuyper's insights somewhat.²⁹

Kuyper had separated regeneration as a work of Spirit without the Word, from regeneration through the Word. This is particularly seen in his idea of slumbering regeneration. Dooyeweerd, by closing this separation and seeing the Word of God as spirit and life, as regeneration power in the sense of I Peter 3:17-21, brought out the central regenerating, redirecting sense of the Word of God as power. A whole series of false problematics formulated by Reformed scholastic theology under the control of nature-grace ground-motive could be dispensed with in radical

29. Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's wetenschapsleer," Phil. Ref., IV (1939), pp. 193-232.

manner. This enabled Dooyeweerd to correct Kuyper's overemphasis on theology, his biblicism, and other remnants of nature-grace thinking as well as to counteract the strong hold which German idealism had on Kuyper.

Before an attempt is made to summarize the development of Dooyeweerd there are two important emphases left to be discussed. The first, tying in closely with Dooyeweerd's struggle to break with biblicism in its various expressions and with theologism in its Reformed, Calvinistic form, is his rather negative attitude toward Reformed theologians. This attitude was occasioned in a large part by his struggle in early years with certain Calvinistic theologians, particularly in respect to the supposed substantial, rational character of the soul and the two natures of the Mediator. In this historic confrontation the entrenchment of Reformed theology in nature-grace thinking became evident to Dooyeweerd.³⁰ After this struggle he seems to have developed a unique aversion towards citing proof-texts in his works. This is particularly noticeable if one compares these works with works antedating this struggle. It is interesting that this phenomenon has occasioned critique from those still enamored with a scholastic, biblicistic, and often fundamentalistic view of the Bible as the Word of God. However, one is increasingly impressed with the all-sided appeal of Dooyeweerd to Scripture for direction and authority. This comes out most in his earlier publications, but generally, the rich biblical emphasis is always present.

This trend in Dooyeweerd is more than a matter for curiosity, because this affects his exegesis of the Scriptures and results in what

30. Dooyeweerd mentions this conflict with the theological faculty of the Free University and is happy that it belongs in the past. "De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie en de strijd der faculteiten," I, Phil. Ref., XXIII (1958), p. 1, footnote.

appears to be a failure to appreciate the revolution in the exegetical branches of theology, especially in Biblical Theology. This seems to be part of the reason for his failure to correct the influence of the nature-grace ground-motive in respect to God's eternity, time, eschatology, creation, man's eternity, etc., in his thought.

The second emphasis is Dooyeweerd's stress on the integral character of ordinary experience. Naive experience, as Dooyeweerd views it, played a key role from the beginning of his work. In many respects this Christian emphasis was inherited from Kuyper. Both Kuyper and Dooyeweerd felt a strong calling to defend Christ's little ones and the plain folk of the Christian community from attack by science which sought to undermine the simple Christ-faith of believers and their implicit trust in the biblical motive of the trustworthy character of the creation order and the meaningfulness of ordinary experience.³¹ This Kuyperian, biblical emphasis enabled Dooyeweerd to break with rationalistic scientism with its uncritical dogma of the autonomy of scientific, theoretical thought, which by its nature depreciated ordinary experience and falsified reality. In contrast to this, Dooyeweerd, like Kuyper before him, viewed thinking as one of the many functions of man's total life, and thus Dooyeweerd immediately saw the influence of Logos speculation on Reformed thinking.

Ordinary experience was seen to be integral in the sense of full and real. Ordinary naive experience and the continuity of time was seen to make it impossible for ordinary experience to view reality in dis-

31. For an early stage in his development of naive experience, in which he has not yet come to his definitive view see, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," pp. 38-59. On p. 59 he refers to ordinary experience as populair.

tinguished modal aspects. Reality was experience as whole, total, and integral. This meant that the subject-object relation was part of this integral implicit experiencing and could no longer be hypostatized into a central polar dialectical opposition, as the autonomy of theoretical thought had done.

The primary datum for all theoretical thinking became the rich, integral, full experiencing of reality as actually given to, and ordinarily experienced by, man. In this sense naive experience knew no theoretical problems because the continuity of time related life integrally. Theoretical thought was seen to be of intentional anti-thetical character in which real experience and reality is broken asunder into its structural components in analysis and viewed together again in theoretical synthesis. Theoretical results could never be identified with the full integral character of experience and reality as given but could now be viewed only as a theoretical account of reality. The gegenstand character of theoretical thought was now sharply opposed to the absolutized subject-object relation in dialectical humanistic thought which was now shown to originate in the autonomy of theoretical science, in which was the Faustian desire for domination of all reality.

These points of naive experience and the gegenstand relation are all important for Dooyeweerd, not only for understanding the transcendental method, but also for the understanding of Scripture, which for Dooyeweerd always appeals to the heart in the language of naive experience, which is the hermeneutical key for theology as a science. The importance of this emphasis is impossible to overrate not only in Dooyeweerd's development, but, more importantly, for its reforming power in the Christian life. This emphasis is in his writings from the beginning

and remained to a great extent unchanged.

This early view of the integral character of naive experience did not mean that he had clearly seen and formulated the nature of the concentration point of naive experience. The idea of the supra-temporal character of the root of all experience following this discovery of the time transcending concentration point postdates Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the nature of naive experience and the gegenstand relation.³² This discovery enabled him to sharpen his transcendental critique and also to unify and develop his work on individuality structures.

In summary now of Dooyeweerd's development we can point to two basic lines. The first to make its appearance was the idea of law especially with the doctrine of sphere sovereignty. This Kuyperian stress on the Lord's ordinances and the importance of sphere sovereignty³³ appears, however, with the important correction that sphere sovereignty is now used in a modal cosmological way and is no longer restricted to spheres of society as it was in Kuyper. This stress is used to evaluate the natural law tradition and to come to the clear knowledge of the true terrain and normative character of jurisprudence. Accompanying this is Dooyeweerd's stress of naive experience reflected in his concern with a Calvinistic world-and-life view which would reflect the uniqueness of the Calvinistic stress on God as sovereign creator and law-giver.³⁴ Involved inextricably with this use of his idea of law in respect to

32. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," passim.

33. Veenhof, In Kuyper's Lijn (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1939), passim.

34. It is interesting to note the change in emphasis from world-and-life view after 1936 to theoretical philosophy, especially in contrast to Popma's emphasis on world-and-life view (Levensbeschouwing, all 7 volumes).

cosmological epistemological problems is the emphasis from the first on the gegenstand relation. The epistemological implications of sphere sovereignty are applied to the logos aspect of reality, especially in confrontation with concept formation as this had been developed by the neo-Kantians and phenomenology.³⁵

The second line comes to the fore when Dooyeweerd formulates the totality, unity, and fullness of meaning on the subject side as the supra-temporal concentration point. This brings with it a sharpening of his transcendental method and critique, a further bringing to focus of the gegenstand relation, cosmic time,³⁶ and the order of before and after of the modal aspects. Along with this second main line, the ground-motives come into focus with more critique on nature-grace thinking and theology, and, accompanying this from his side, his view of the Word of God.

As these two main lines develop side by side, we find Dooyeweerd characterizing his philosophy more and more in terms of the second main emphasis, i.e., in terms of the concentration point, the ground-motive, and the transcendental critique. His emphasis on characterizing all systems as having an implicit or explicit idea of law recedes somewhat into the background and the emphasis is put on transcendental critique and ground-motives.³⁷ Along with the stress on ground-motives seems

35. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," pp. 36ff., where he uses the term "logos" to describe the logical aspect.

36. With this second line the emphasis is placed more on sphere universality than sovereignty, so that the stress is on the transcendental direction, opening process, disharmony in the disclosure process, and the dynamics of meaning pointing to the supra-temporal self.

37. Van Riessen deals with the problem of the shift of emphasis in Dooyeweerd in "Over de betekenis van de wetsidee in de wijsbegeerte," Phil. Ref., XXX (1965).

to go a lack of emphasis on a world-and-life view that was characteristic of his early writings.

These two main lines go on together and provide the total and unified theoretical vision by which Dooyeweerd then develops his theory concerning modal aspects and individuality (especially societal) structures in later years in terms, generally, of the first line, and dovetailing with this, his historical critique and evaluation particularly in the light of the three ground-motives. With the second main line comes the increasing ecumenical character of his work.³⁸ The first line as focusing on the law idea was thought of as providing leading ideas for a more distinct and unified Calvinistic life-style and world-view.

38. Dooyeweerd, "Het ecumenisch-reformatorisch grond-motief," p. 14. Here he speaks of his first period of philosophizing, i.e., before he discovered the transcendental critique. Instead of the emphasis on the wetsidee he would rather have the philosophy stamped as christelijke transcendentale filosofie. This is the point that is questioned by van Riessen (previous footnote). We begin to see the second period arise in 1930 with the discovery of the prism and the supra-temporal concentration point, and the root unity on the subject side. The transcendental character of his thinking quickly develops from this time.