

Norms for the International Economic Order¹

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Editor's Introduction:

The initial impetus to edit this essay and give it a fresh publication was my study of Bob Goudzwaard's English-language corpus and the construction of an annotated bibliography that makes these writings available for those who would like to read them. Since I had also recently constructed a similar bibliography of the writings of Jim Skillen over the same 40 year time-span (1967-2007), it was natural to also include Jim's response to the presentation of Goudzwaard and van Baars at that 1978 conference. Since this exchange took place, both Goudzwaard and Skillen have contributed significantly to a Christian reformational approach to the normativity that characterises social science in all its various disciplinary expressions, including jurisprudence. And at times they have worked together on various projects.

The response of Professor J D van der Vyver is also included in this republication in order to give a complete historical record of that conference session.

Skillen's response is that of the political scientist who, identifies with the attempt of the writers to remove hurdles to a normative social scientific approach. Nevertheless, he notes that their discussion of economics is overly oriented to issues which are central to his (ie Skillen's) own discipline; very helpful in identifying issues that should be of relevance to Government and political organizations but less helpful for business and commercial organizations, and the contributions of ecclesiastical, academic and other non-public institutions to the international order.

Van der Vyver, on the other hand, has a different view of norms and the impact they have upon social life (see pp. 49-50 below [262-263]). While in some places he suggests that Goudzwaard and van Baars are idealistic, if not Utopian, in other places he expresses complete agreement. From the standpoint of the Goudzwaard/ Skillen contribution to a new understanding of the "normative orientation" of the social sciences, van der Vyver's "Response" is helpful if only to identify some of the conceptual problems that need to be confronted in the analysis of global/ international society, particularly in relation to the making of binding international agreements (*pacta sunt servanda*). On the other hand, van der Vyver's critique of the paper of Goudzwaard and van Baars, even with its heavy reliance upon distinctions implicit in Dooyeweerd's social philosophy, points us to some significant intellectual hurdles that will have to be overcome if the normative direction of social science is to be followed.

For the writing of the jointly-authored paper, Goudzwaard was the major writer and van Baars offered critical comments and suggestions as they went along. Van Baars' contribution is

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- 1 Editor's note: This is a slightly edited 2008 republication of the original essay, delivered in 1978. There are minor corrections to spelling, grammar and syntax.
 - 2 Editor's Note: the footnotes in the original appear on pages 252 and 253. In this edition they appear below the text, and major bibliographical items listed on pp. 252-253 are found in Footnote 13. The original paper ends on p. 252. New footnotes will be indicated by "Editor's Note". Original footnotes are indicated by a bracketed numeral for both the major paper and van der Vyver's "Response". There were no footnotes to Skillen's "Response".

particularly evident in the discussion of the juridical norm (The Norm of Justice pp. 15-17 [233-235]), the materials noted in footnote 13 [8], and also section 5, "The Problem of global control of raw materials" (pp. 24-28 [241-244]).

A year before this conference, in July 1977, Bob and Jim, accompanied by Bernie Zylstra, visited South Africa. That trip is also part of the background to this paper, in particular where it considers the problem of apartheid in South Africa with quotes from the Koinonia Declaration. The September 1975 conference which had preceded this one, had been staged at Potchefstroom University of Christian Higher Education in South Africa, where van der Vyver was employed. The Koinonia Declaration had been issued in November 1977 by a group at that university and in fact were led by van der Vyver himself; this was also the time that news broke concerning the "Information Scandal" (Muldergate) that ended the political careers of some of the most ardent advocates of apartheid.

It should also be noted that edited sections from Goudzwaard's 1978 paper can be found in his contribution to the reader edited by James W Skillen and Rockne M McCarthy **Political Order and the Plural Structure of Society** Scholars Press, Atlanta 1991. "The Introduction and Statement of the Problem" (1978: 223-224) is found in the 1991 version under the same heading on pages 343-344. "A Short Excursion on the Structure of the Science of Economics" (1978: 229-231) corresponds to "A Short Excursus on the Science of Economics" (1991: 344-346). "Basic Norms for the Ordering of Society" (1978: 231-236) corresponds in the later edition to the section of the same name (1991: 346-351). "The International Society as the Junction of Norm Realization" (1978: 236-239) corresponds to a section of the same name in the later version (1991: 352-353).

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A. Normative Approach

1. Introduction and Statement of the Problem

The phenomena of justice and injustice as well as anticipated developments in the international economic scene have been dealt with in the foregoing presentations.³ The purpose of this essay is to ask what norms ought to be applied to both these phenomena and these developments, and what might and ought to be the characteristics of a (more) just international economic order.

With a topic like this we face right at the start the threat of falling into daydreaming. To begin with, already in antiquity compassion was hardly a prominent characteristic of the economic process. "I saw ... under the sun that, where justice ought to be, there was wickedness ... I saw the tears of the oppressed, and I saw that there was no one to comfort them," wrote the Preacher many centuries ago. He added in the same breath, "Strength was on the side of their oppressors, and there was no one to avenge them" (Ecclesiastes 3:16;

4:1). Injustice is a form of the exercise of power, a misuse of power. The fight against injustice, which is rooted in the commandment to do justice and love the neighbour, always demands, therefore, a confrontation with what is powerful. And one who sees that isn't about to be overconfident.

But secondly, the development of the world economy points to an aggravation rather than a melioration of these relationships. The "trends" which prognosticators must detect in what is happening indicate that injustice will increase rather than decrease. A striking example of this is the brief sketch by Rajni Kothari in **On the Creation of a Just World Order**, in which he ascribes a partly evil effect to the West's persistent striving for modernization.

The widely accepted model of modernization along a preconceived course of change has already released forces that will accentuate ethnic and class cleavages, internal violence and armed conflicts between neighbours. The economic gap will continue to widen, minimum conditions will become increasingly hard to achieve except in a few fortunate or favoured nations, and patterns of dominance will continue, with at least some {224} of the big powers trying to exploit the existing misery with ready aid, distorting economic policies and mortgaging all future generations to mounting burdens of debt repayment. Poorer countries will continue to be told to engage in family planning to restrain their populations, to integrate their ethnic minorities and "motivate" their illiterate farmers, if necessary through coercive methods, and to leave the real problems of world power and its distribution to be tackled by the big powers through appropriate balances and spheres of influence.⁴

Kathari's sketch is likely one-sided, but his bitterness - he speaks from the context of his experience in India - is rooted in trends that are a discernible part of today's reality.⁵ He summarizes his prediction of the future as follows:

The upshot of all this is a growing dualism in the world, in large part expressed along a North-South hiatus. As this hiatus cannot be resolved militarily - thanks to the oligopolistic control of the balance of terror - and as the institutional structure of international economic relationships will militate against a viable

3 This is a reference to the other papers presented to the Second International Conference of Reformed Institutions for Christian Higher Education.

4 (1) Rajni Kothari, "World Politics and World Order: the Issue of Autonomy" in Paul Mendlovitz ed. **On the Creation of a Just World Order** Amsterdam 1976, p. 40.

5 (2) Compare in this connection also the incisive study of B Zylstra "Modernization and the American Empire", in *International Reformed Bulletin* 1976.

*domestic economic solution, the poorer and dependent countries will continue to engage in militant anti-colonial postures, exploited by local power-seekers and demagogues without any regard for the welfare of their people.*⁶

Domination, modernization prompted by self-interest, exploitation by the already affluent West, which has become hooked on its goals of continuous economic and technological expansion - these factors are threatening to tear the world apart and to arouse counterforces that are hardly or not at all capable of promoting greater justice. Between 1950 and 1967 a total of 18 billion dollars of foreign capital was invested in Latin America. But in the same period returns on foreign capital in profits, dividends, and interest payments on loans amounted to 24 billion dollars. So the outflow of capital exceeded the influx by 6 billion dollars.⁷ Thus the economic systems of East and West are aggravating the injustice, rather than leading to a more just distribution of goods in the world economy. No wonder that the poor countries of the Third World are searching for possibilities for forming power blocs as a counterbalance, for they know that the struggle for a more just world economic order will be illusory so long as its creation is dependent only on the good will of the rich countries.

The achievement of justice in international economic relationships is a matter of rowing against the stream, a stream moreover which keeps dragging us back, sometimes back past the point where the struggle began.

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2. Models, Norms and Ends

Academicians are also involved in this struggle against incipient or open injustice in global economic relationships. They point out where it is found, make predictions, and offer suggestions for betterment. One of the tools available to them is the projection of (world) models.

A recent addition has been mathematical models on a global scale. This

6 (3) Gustavo Lagos, "The Revolution of Being", in Mendlovitz ed *op cit* at p. 75

7 (4) Cf. B Linneman, John Garbutt **Mensen Tellen** Utrecht 1960 pp. 40-44

development only came about with the study of Meadows and Forrester on the limits to growth done for the Club of Rome in 1969-1972. Yet we can now say that a great variety of such models are now available. Not long ago a special international symposium was devoted to these world models (organized by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and held in Baden, Austria, in September, 1977). The world models display widely divergent characteristics. Sometimes they are purely projective; from the perspective of changing or more permanent hypotheses, lines are extrapolated from the present into the future. When these hypotheses assume the form of alternative policies, they take on a more operational character. Drawing on different scenarios, they expose the results of different policy choices on a global level.

Finally, there are also models in which a conscious choice is made for a certain, necessary international economic order and the provisions that need to go with it; the projected results of this choice are then contrasted to what will happen if the present world order is continued. In other words, models can be purely projective but also strongly suggestive for the initiation of policy. They can have implications only for the economic realm, or they can have a determinative bearing on the shape of other institutions as well (such as the creation of a world government).

And they can also be driven by very different visions of the world and society. S. R. Parmar of India, for example, characterized the model of Forrester and Meadows as a typical product of the thinking of the rich, developed nations who are constantly struggling with the problem of the fall-out from an endless striving after material abundance and their attempt to create for themselves the best chances for survival.⁸ **The Bariloche Report** of Dr. Amilcar Herrera can be seen as the most important counterfact to Forrester and Meadows. It is written from the viewpoint of Third World interests which concern primarily fulfilling basic needs such as food, clothing, housing, and education, rather than initiating as quickly as possible the Western pattern of growth. This model, therefore, proceeds from the idea that adequate production factors (capital and educated and trained workers) have to be made available in various regions in order to satisfy these basic needs; and this has to be achieved by means of sacrifices made by the rich countries of the world.

8 (5) Paul Mendlovitz *op cit* p. xvi.

The **RIO Report** of Tinbergen *et al.*, and the various models of the "World Order Model Projects" (WOMP's) put relatively more emphasis on the necessary *institutional* reforms to be effected in the world, [226] including the transfer of power and rights to world authorities and functional world agencies. "It is my considered judgment that there is no longer a question of whether or not there will be world government by the year 2000," writes Paul Mendlovitz in the foreword to the above mentioned book, **On the Creation of a Just World Order**. The only questions we have to ask are about how it will come into being.

This very brief survey shows that in the hands of responsible academics world models can be important weapons to arouse and warn the nations of the world and their political leaders and to point them to available alternative policies. At the same time, however, certain kinds of model-conceptions contain an element that raises some questions: that is, the desire to produce consciously and systematically a new world order - including a balanced complex of institutions, a socio-economic order, and a concomitant world culture - out of nothing, as it were. This tendency is especially pronounced among a number of the collaborators on the World Order Project, who are striving for a "global movement for world-order reform". In his paper, "Towards a New World Order", Richard Falk says of it, "Such a movement requires an agreed ideology. It should be noted here that ideology is being used in an affirmative sense to denote a body of thought relevant to the pursuit of explicit social, political, and economic goals". The term "cultural engineering" is used in this connection as expressing the necessity for the attainment of "a substantially improved world order by the year 2000" - an order which makes it possible to reach the values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, ecological stability, and a positive human identity. Our task, as Mendlovitz formulates it, is to create an analytical frame of reference which will give us the intellectual tools "for coming to grips with these problems so as to *realize* our values, which are termed *world order values*" (emphasis ours).⁹

Is this the route we must together follow? Or do certain things threaten to become topsy-turvy here?

9 (5) Paul Mendlovitz *op cit* p. xvi.

These questions may seem to have only a limited significance - a dialogue on the sidelines with a few model-makers who want to improve the world. But this appearance would be deceiving. As we said in the opening section, justice in international economic relationships is a matter of rowing against the stream. It involves a confrontation with powers and with an established misuse of power. In this field of awesome power an academic may feel himself even more powerless than might a politician. What is he or she to do in the midst of this distorted and increasingly more distorted world? In such a situation there is the temptation - one that grows daily as soon as he concerns himself with real social questions - to elect to take his fixed point of orientation in the great engagement of the future, in order to also scientifically formulate concrete and integral goals for the national and international social order, based on world order values. In this [227] way goals are chosen which must in one way or another be realized in the future, and for whose realization the man or woman of science can prescribe, if not provide, the necessary *means*. These means may vary from practical socio-economic proposals and substantial institutional transformations to ideologies which are needed at the cultural and religious level so as to give the realization of the chosen goals a chance.

But isn't it necessary for scientists of our time to take a challenging and bold position, one which includes far-reaching practical proposals and institutional changes? Certainly. But precisely in taking this bold position, every scientist must be careful that he does not swamp the *norms* by which he is bound for *values* of his own making; in other words, he must not allow his reflection on the future to take the place of the appeal to principles which from the start are given to all mankind and to all human authorities as guiding principles. Otherwise, he or she will set in motion a process that is ruled by the dialectic, the unavoidable alteration, of the drive for freedom and domination. No person of science can by creative thinking produce a new and better world out of himself. As he analyses facts and traces trends, his most important task is to guard the norms that God has given for the good of all mankind. Only in standing by these norms, which hold good for all created reality (and which validate themselves in the whole of world history), may he expect to do something of healing for the world of his time.

Several points need further clarification. I'll try to do this in three ways:

- a) by bringing the role of ideology-formation into the discussion;
- b) by referring to the important views of Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker about the designing of world models;
- c) by a short excursion on the structure of the science of economics.

a. The role of ideology

All people opt for certain goals in their personal lives. Human social organisms do the same. The projection of goals for society is therefore not evil by itself. But it is warranted to speak of danger when the content of these goals is fixed in strict and concrete terms, and when, in addition, they begin to act in that form as a moral imperative which "in whatever way" must determine the course of events.

Contemporary Western society has developed as it pursued goals that have become ends in themselves. This becoming ends in themselves - among others in the form of serving the continuous growth of prosperity, the progress of an (autonomous) technological development, and an unhindered development of science - is somewhat related to the secularisation of Western culture and the accompanying loss of the [228] awareness of norms. The goals must, as it were, take over the regulating function previously reserved for the generally recognized (although not always observed) norms. But when goals are posited in *this* sense and take on *this* kind of status, they in a certain sense begin to function as a new source of revelation. They necessarily begin to emanate their views. This is the source of many kinds of ideologies in Western society (in accordance with the above cited definition by Falk: "Ideology is being used in an affirmative sense to denote a body of thought relevant to the pursuit of explicit social, political and economic goals"). Ideologies are forms of norm awareness that are goal-directed above all. In an ideology norms and values derive their content from a pre-selected practical goal, whether this be the security of an existing society or the creation of a new, completely differently-oriented society. It is the goal that predominates; it has become the central meaning of life and society, and from it there are bound to issue the necessarily specifically-directed (distorted) contents of the norms. The first report by Forrester and Meadows about the limits to growth, for example, had such an ideological effect. Oriented to the will to survive as its dominating goal, it gave birth to its own "ethics of survival", consisting in the concrete prescription of zero economic growth and a maximum number of two children per family. This new ethic is an

ethic of numbers, revealed to us by the computer.

In reflecting on the ordering of our international economic relations, all ideologizing and binding blueprints of better worlds ought, therefore, to be avoided. They evoke a need to dominate cultural and intellectual processes which are scarcely any longer related to freedom and justice in their original sense. Furthermore, the concrete demand for justice *here and now* may never ideologically be buried or sidetracked in the name of fragile visions of the future, no matter how scientifically formulated. Goals may and should be set; but they should always be accompanied by a huge dose of relativity. Goals should not be the ultimate inspiration of our life (and society).

b. The views of Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker

Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, in his essay, "A Sceptical Contribution"¹⁰, has shed an interesting light on the limits inherent in planning for and controlling the future according to models. Von Weizsacker (who holds an honorary degree from the University in Amsterdam) points out in his presentation a dominant trend of thought which he calls "intellectual activism" - a trend of thought which stands behind all planning. It has arisen out of our modern vision of science and technology which has learned to think about the world in terms of possibilities of controlling it. "On the one hand developing tendencies are observed and extrapolated, using causal analysis as much as possible, to determine future developments. On the other hand one formulates goals, and seeks ways of attaining them within this interplay of causes and effects. The interpretation of the Good by the concept value serves this mode of thought. Values such as we have listed are goals to be attained by action" (p. 112).

[229] But, so argues von Weizsacker, this method of thinking has its limitations and its dangers. It suggests that whatever one wants to have (values) can be achieved by acting in a certain way. "I avoid the formulation: What should we do? It has the weakness that it gives the impression that we only need to say what is to be done and then do it. But this would be inadequate ... it becomes a formulation of the world of the will and understanding" (p. 147). And, so he says elsewhere, "Simply exerting will and understanding cannot solve the

problem of the future" (p. 144). For "as long as direct dominance of the world by the will and understanding lasts, a technocratic structure of society will grow and become stabilized" (p. 145). For a society which is truly just can only be that on the basis of *truth* and *peace*. "But the way to the truth cannot be programmed, for were this so, we should already for the most part possess it" (p. 114). And peace? "Only he who finds peace with himself, and that means peace with God, can radiate peace. But the peace that arises from a group of men is no possible target of a plan any longer, no preferred world for intellectual activists". Happiness and truth cannot be planned targets: "Truth is not made, it is revealed" (p. 143). "Keeping the commandments may bring happiness, but happiness is no criterion for the justification of the commandment".

The vision of von Weizsacker - which is coupled with a fascinating exposition of the dangers of the once-for-all goals of the capitalistic market economy - is also of importance for us because of the indication in his article of two possibilities of legitimate model-thinking for the student of science, "two kinds of utopias (which) we may plan", in which we need not necessarily fall into the trap of modern intellectual activism. The first type is that of a "modest utopia" which aims at combating "generally recognized evils". In this case it is not the designing and execution by the will and intellectual of an ideal future world that comes first; what comes first is the direct attack on what everyone recognizes here and now as having become distorted. In this connection a condition is that these evils "can be fought with technical means which are in principle unproblematic". The second type has a more challenging character and is directed to the possible solution of one or more concrete world problems that are desperately in need of a solution, such as that of world peace. However, the picture of a possible solution will then likewise have to be challenging and bold in character, so that those who deal with practical life will indeed recognize it as utopian (p. 114).

c. A short excursion on the structure of the science of economics

At first sight it seems very unreal to connect the problem of justice in international economic relations and approaches in terms of particular models with the methodology of

10 [6] Cf. von Weizsacker, "A Sceptical Contribution" in Mendlovitz *op cit* p. 111-150.

economics as a science. The connection between both subjects becomes clearer, however, when we realize that economics as a science is inclined to start from human needs as given ends, which then as best as possible should be satisfied by the available means through a process of choice. In other words economics is a science which knows given ends, ends which it regards as present in the economic subjects from moment to moment. Consequently the economist as a student of science expresses himself only about the application of means (and their correctness) in connection with such given purposes.

Economics calls itself an aspect-science, and it acknowledges that in human activity, ethical considerations, for instance, can also play a role. What is, however, a consequence of this goals-means constructions is that the ethics of human activity is regarded as coming to expression only in the goals of the activity. For the application of the means only one norm is considered valid, namely that of efficiency, of the best possible way to satisfy the given goals. With the human goals as given, the economist pretends that he knows for sure how the economic subjects will use their means.

Striking in this concept of science is its ideologizing effect. Human needs are, as it were, put first, and as independent entities are made the source of determining the correctness or incorrectness of human economic behaviour. Relative to the human goals or needs, right is whatever is efficient or useful, whatever optimally satisfies the existing needs. It is a typically Western conception of science which, instead of being neutral or objective as it pretends, has in fact entirely undergirded, and still does to some extent, the construction of a Western society which has proclaimed the goals of an ever-expanding income and the satisfaction of needs as the central ends for the construction of human society - a society, moreover, which so uses or allocates the means (labour, capital) that are necessary - that the obvious needs of the consumer and government are always being satisfied in the most efficient manner, even when that efficiency brings about, for instance, the alarming loneliness of the labouring man. There is no room for normativity (an extra-economic consideration) in the use of the means, only in the goals,

This short exposition teaches us anew that economic goals that are made central, however responsibly chosen and however ethically responsible, cannot and may not be a

substitute for the immediate validity of norms in human society. For the validity of norms concerns not only the goals; it concerns no less the means and the mode of their application.

By way of summary, it could be said that the modern student of science (and the politician) is deluded if he thinks that he is able to contemplate and change the world without starting from a deep respect for given norms. The "values" which he has chosen on the basis of goals will begin to function as pseudo-norms, and they will subject society to a process of ideologization which distorts culture and deprives it of freedom. The scholar who does acknowledge heteronomous norms - that is, norms that come from outside - is apparently at a strong disadvantage. He is more open in his choice of goals and has more of an eye for relativity, which in the appli-[231]-cation of instruments and means he always asks the question whether that is doing the right thing. Yet in contrast, precisely he or she is able to make the deepest possible appeal to nations and to their political and social leaders. For the question concerning what is good and just is the question which addresses people and societies on the level of their deepest responsibilities toward God and fellow man. It is the question that calls people back to the norms which from the very beginning have held for man, instead of being a question that calls us toward what people may be able to do in the future. With the latter question there is only the opening toward results which we must bring about. With the first question there is also the opening toward the blessing while listening to norms - the law as *Thora* - can evoke. For blessing is by definition that result which is not *apriori*-ly sure.

3. Basic Norms for the Ordering of Society

Speaking about fixed, given, valid norms for international economic relations, we do not mean thereby fixed and concrete behavioural guidelines. It concerns much rather basic norms which have the character of a "weisung" (Martin Buber), which as *Thora* open up a path toward the future on which one can safely walk. Justice is such a basic norm which again and again must be recognized by men, and followed and elaborated.

The speaking about and searching for norms pertaining to international economic relations conceal no idealism, only realism. Idealism is much rather characteristic of those

modern designers of the future who by means of planning want to create an entirely renovated world. In contrast, it is realistic to acknowledge that in the world no society can be permanent if in that society there is not a certain respect for basic norms.

From the perspective of the Christian conviction, it can even be posited that this world, as created world, is intended for listening to norms as the core of its responsibility. Only in and through the response of justice, of love for the neighbour, of caring for nature entrusted to us does this created world reach its destination. When these norms are negated - which means that power, technology, prosperity do not "open up" to the service of God and the fellow man, but are given an independent existence as supposedly meaningful in themselves - this created world is bound to react adversely. Societal-distorting phenomena, such as the pollution of the environment, malnutrition, loneliness, and long-term unemployment, ought therefore not to be interpreted in terms of fate that has struck, but in terms of failing human responsibility. They are signs on the walls of this creation that we ourselves have been weighed in the balances and found wanting. That implies at the same time the possibility of an appeal to ourselves and others. There are norms, and they are valid for everyone - for all men and for all cultures and societies. [232] "Culture is response" (Onvlee). The awareness of evil in the world can be misshapen and distorted, but where it exists it points to the validity of norms which cannot and may not with impunity be transgressed, for people and their societies.

Where it concerns giving form to an international economic order and the evils that occur on this level, those norms are especially important which directly apply to the *economic* aspect, the judicial aspect, and the social aspect of the world society. How can we give a more specific designation of those norms without ourselves, in giving that designation, falling into some ideology, choosing that interpretation which is coloured by what we secretly "somehow" want to safeguard and achieve? With a "Western" awareness of norms which is marked by Western ideals of modernization, desires of power, and dreams of prosperity, there is no possibility of a genuine solution. For it will be clear that we, whoever we are, cannot trust ourselves here. To every interpretation of a norm we add our own distortions. But as Christians, it is precisely at this point that we must acknowledge the great importance of a Biblical mode of thinking which we must constantly search out

anew. For the Bible contains the revelation to every man and every society for what is really "good", "true" and of service to our neighbour.

a. The Economic Norm

Economics has become a colorless term, a more or less neutral designation of all human activity that has to do with scarcity. To the degree that in the West it still has a normative significance - economic versus non-economic - it contains no more than a reference to waste and/or a lack of efficiency.

As we noted, that designation of the economic norm contains an ideological restriction which is stamped by the Western mentality which has elevated the expansion of material prosperity to a goal in itself. It is striking that already Aristotle contrasted two conceptions of economics: *chrematistiike*, the pursuit of more monetary possessions as good in itself (gain for gain's sake), and *oikonomia*, the net profitable management of the *patrimonium*, the goods inherited from the fathers for the benefit of all who are dependent on it for their livelihood. Naturally there is also in Aristotle in this formation of a concept, a certain distortion of the norm. In his thinking, the idea of *oikonomia* serves at least partially to conserve an existing, patriarchal order of society; moreover, in this thinking, moderation, doing things in moderation, is recognizable as an independent human virtue.¹¹ But Aristotle's designation hides nonetheless an important element of truth, which in the Western economic expansion has for a long time been suppressed entirely, namely, the mandate of the careful management of whatever has been entrusted to man for the sake of the welfare of many. The Bible speaks also of the human economic challenge in terms of stewardship, a term which right away makes clear that man must govern the world by regarding it as belonging to someone else.

[233] In the norm of stewardship as the basic norm of all of economic life, the following aspects can be detected.

i. **Conservation** - the care for this creation and its fruit-bearing potential

11 Editor's note : In the Footnotes and Bibliography p.252-3 this footnote is listed as "7" whereas in the text it was designated as "9". It reads: (7) See further on this Aristotelian distinction the interesting note in Karl Marx **Das Kapital** Band I, II Abschrift, Kapittel 4, par.1.

for this and for future generations. The "robbing" of a world, its total exploitation for one's own good, clashes with the norm of stewardship.

ii. **Avoidance of waste** - the avoidance of the senseless loss of possibilities for use. This normative element is misused by making it independent and reducing it to (mere) monetary "efficiency", but at its core it remains a legitimate element of our economic mandate. Whatever is of value or has been obtained by labour may not be lost by spendthrift recklessness or lack of insight.

iii. **Urgency** - giving preference to those forms of use which are the most urgent in the totality of the fulfilment of man's challenge. Here ideology has also had its influence. Western individualism speaks of the order of priority, of human needs as a purely individual concern, in which everyone autonomously or sovereignly may go to work for himself. But this is a dangerous bypassing of the recognition that the fruits of the world, God's creation, are intended for *all* mankind (Calvin); man as steward is here replaced by "man as owner".

The criterion of urgency involves the distinction between quasi- or unnecessary needs and real needs. It is uneconomic (in the sense of violating a norm of stewardship given to man) when in a world economy the fulfilment of artificial, advertising-induced needs, or quasi-needs, makes the fulfilment of basic needs here or elsewhere impossible or very difficult. That is not only unjust, it is likewise uneconomic. It is an unjust way of managing scarce means in a world economy.

What basic needs (that is, needs which deserve priority in the satisfaction of human needs) are cannot be determined equally for all times and cultures. They are, however, always connected with what is of vital significance for man's existence as man and for man's fulfilment of his calling. Necessary nutrition, clothing, and shelter belong to it, and likewise the possibility of meaningful labour. It also involves a minimum of common needs, such as the need for education and medical care.

b. The Norm of Justice

Emil Brunner has said that the wealth of the rich is unjust because it makes the poverty of others necessary (**Gerechtigheit** Dutch edition p. 259). This formulation expresses an authentic element of the norm of justice in its validity for economic relations, namely, that no one may be pushed aside or cheated out of what he is [234] entitled to. This holds for persons, but likewise for races, classes, national groups.

Here too it must be noted that the ideologies have done a thorough job. The ideology of the *class* struggle has bent the norm of justice in its own direction by positing that the totality of what has been produced belongs either to the governing class or to the labouring class (in Marx every form of profit and interest is *by definition* exploitation). The ideology of the state maintains that to the state belong both the ownership of the ground and the means for production as well as the fruits of all human labour - whereby the state from its side obligates itself to support its subjects. The *prosperity* ideology of the West has by and large reduced the norm of justice to a common sharing in the prosperity, for which reason there must constantly be growth (here justice stops with the giving of a financial payment - the so-called "social justice"). In contrast the *equality* ideologies hold that everyone should receive an equal share of the total goods and/or products in society (apparently through some governing body, which thus is bound to have a very unequal share in the total exercise of power in society). Finally, we may also mention here the *national* ideologies which bend the demands of justice in the direction of a servility fixed in advance to the preservation of the identity of one's own nation or national existence, even where this creates a permanent economic disadvantage or discrimination in their several freedoms for those who are not members of the nation but only live in that area. Considering all this, it seems nearly impossible to speak properly about the norm of justice as it pertains to the international context. Therefore there follow here some carefully formulated annotations derived from the Biblical idea of justice (*tzedeka*).

- i. In the Biblical revelation, justice is never without a double address. It is first of all a call which is addressed to those who have the right to give orders: to the prince because he has received authority from God; the judge because he has to pronounce justice, the property owner because his property gives him the obligation of enabling the neighbour to make a living. Justice has always a specific address, and it *presupposes* existing responsibility. In the second place there is also always a specific personal address with respect to those who must be the beneficiaries of justice. The widows, the orphans, the Levites without land, the debtors, the labourers - they are always mentioned by name. Though the demand of justice is not limited to those who are mentioned here, it is nevertheless undeniable that to be subject to injustice is particularly the lot of the weaker ones in society. Important to note, also, is that this addressing of specific groups of people again and again exceeds the boundaries of race, nation, social level and class: the foreigners and sojourners in Israel share in the nation's social and civil legislation. Justice, including its orientation to personal situations, is always specifically oriented; it does not just hang in the air.
- ii. Justice always includes an emancipation motif. It is never [235] a question of money alone or of sharing in power alone. It is a motif of liberation, of the restoration of life in the comprehensive sense with respect to those who are suppressed and have lost the perspective of a fruitful and happy life. In Biblical revelation, justice and reconciliation belong together. Therefore it

also speaks of a justice which must exceed the righteousness of the Pharisees. Justice involves not only the relief of the oppressed and those in straitened circumstances, but also help in building a new life; prisoners do not only receive their freedom, but are also received again as members of society. Therefore justice and paternalism, or humiliation, constitute deep contrasts. Justice implies that the other (human being, nation) is restored to *his* rightful place to resume and independently fulfil again his own calling.

iii. Justice in the Biblical sense is not in the first place a choice for or against certain forms of possessions, but it concerns whether the available property is open or closed to the other. Justice in ancient Israel demanded of every farmer that he would not harvest his entire land, but leave something for all who would pass by, and also that he would deposit in the gate one-tenth of his yield for those who might need it. In the legal order of Israel, property is not the exclusive title to something. This rule holds too with respect to financial property. The poor are entitled to what the rich can give or loan them, without interest payment entering into the picture. In this legal order, goods and money connect people, instead of dividing them into classes and groups. The property is subject to every rightful claim of the neighbor.

These elements of biblical thinking about justice will have to be included as criteria for evaluating every international order, also the present one. Already at this point it can be said that with respect to each of the three above-mentioned elements of the norm of justice, this international order is woefully deficient. In the relationship between the poor and the rich countries, one notices that the rich countries consistently seek their own advantage - with respect to the application of the norm of justice, they look first of all within their own borders. It is, moreover, a meagre and condescending justice which is "practiced" - there is no attempt to help other countries to achieve their *own* development in accordance with their *own* calling. In the third place, the social systems of East and West can be typically called closed systems. The possessions of the rich nations are not open to the rightful claims of the poor nations. Much rather, exclusive claims are made on raw materials outside the rich countries' own borders, in the very heart of the territory of countries who may later badly need these same raw materials for their own development.

c. The Social Norm

The economic norm - stewardship - and the norm of justice contain several social aspects. Yet with that it seems that the normativity which is to be characteristic of the social contact between people [236] and nations have not yet been described sufficiently. Social life is also characterized by a normativity of its own. As regards the relation of the one person to the other and of the one nation to the other, there must also be a direct relation in a bond of "actual" solidarity and respect. For precisely in international *economic* relations

there is the danger that the mutual relations will be limited to the context of money, goods, and power, dominated by what Martin Buber once has called the "I-it" relationship, which can threaten the vital "I-Thou" relationship and also supersede it. The respect for cultures other than one's own (whereby culture can be viewed as the total mode of association of people among each other and of men relative to nature) deserves an obvious place in all international contacts. Two more specific designations as to what social norms can imply can be found in the words "participation" and "cooperation".

Participation does not imply a total equality of the power to decide. It does imply that people and nations are directly involved in decisions that have a bearing on their own destination. This norm stems from the creation of each man in the image of God. One may not deal with fellow human beings and fellow nations as if they are will-less objects without their own judgment, their own conscience, their own input. Participation involves, therefore, a direct co-responsibility.

Cooperation includes more than the preparedness to reckon with each other; it expresses the necessity of cooperation. Without cooperation every form of living together will eventually collapse. Cooperation, too, has a foundation in the Biblical revelation. People have not been made different in order to be unequal, but precisely in order that, as equals, they may be needing each other all the more (Calvin). Cooperation emphasizes the necessity of human societal formation as answer responsibilities which can only jointly be borne; it is, therefore, the complement of human responsibility. To give an example, without cooperation even an idea which in itself is correct, such as that of *self-reliance* - the formation according to one's own insights of one's own society, culturally, socially, and economically - will founder in a limited attempt to achieve autonomy or autarchy. The development of one's own culture ought to be respected, yet at the same time it ought to remain open for service to the other.

4. The International Society as the Junction of Norm Realization

In part 2 we opposed the growing tendency to expect everything in the struggle against injustice in international economic relations from blueprints for the establishment of a comprehensively better world society in the social, economic, and political area, whose

realization "in whatever way" must be systematically carried through. Such blueprints, so it was argued, entail their own need to possess the power to rule, which from the cultural perspective can result in a necessity of ideologization. With von Weizsacker we stated that it may be better to zero in on concrete evils and to fight them with responsible means, [237] because herein the appeal to people and societies can continue to be heard undilutedly, and because from the perspective of a vital norm, awareness of failing responsibilities can again and again be exposed.

All that does not alter the fact that there also can be in the structure or ordering of the (international) society, concrete evil situations. Societal structures can partly be living incarnations of sin and evil. Not because in their formation they would not agree with what the people are really like in society - it is a modern superstition which sees all evil in the world as concentrated in evil structures so that man, being inwardly good, is really innocent - but precisely because of societal structures they too are an expression of wrong human desires.

The economic systems of East and West have arisen as incarnations of the individualistic or collectivistic technical-material striving of man toward progress. But that is also how an international economic order has become distorted - initially characterised by a dominant Western colonialism, nowadays by an often no less dominant Western economic neo-colonialism, with a superimposed striving towards modernization as a complement that is taken for granted.

We must, therefore, not be afraid to plead for concrete reforms and perhaps make or support daring proposals, also relative to the international societal order. The point of contact, however, is always the question of where in the existing societal order that are *concrete evils* which would involve fundamental deviations of basic norms such as the norm of justice and of stewardship. So not only is a counter-weight thrown up against an excessive thinking in terms of purpose, but also it becomes clear which responsibility is not lived up to and to whom the appeal for change is to be directed. A contribution can likely be made step-by-step towards a renewal of the international economic order as the junction of global norm-realization, as a normative-regulative framework for all social-economic

relations across national boundaries,

Raising here the question with respect to the responsibility for failure (and the consequently arisen evils) is, relative to the effectuation of a renewed international societal order, by no means of secondary importance. The preservation and upbuilding of a societal order is always a matter of competencies, of a variety of responsibilities. Insofar as an international economic order is shaped by the action of cooperating national states, we have, for instance, to deal directly with the nature of governmental behaviour itself. Governments have received power in order that that they may righteously serve society, without, however, having to regulate everything in it. There exists a personal area of life, a personal conscience - areas which ought to be respected by governments. Their responsibility is always a *public* responsibility. In other words, not every form of injustice, not every evidence of uneconomic and unsocial behaviour is a matter of [238] government concern (or, on the international level, of cooperating governments). They only become a government matter when the interests of the entire nation or of the society of nations as such are involved.

Therefore, as regards the role of the national state relative to the international economic order, it is best to speak of a duty to act in accordance with the norm of *public* justice (which for that matter may directly induce the national state to participate in international agreements and arrangements and the establishment of international or supranational institutions). Here that acting includes the duty to (help) create the juridical and institutional framework within which also non-government persons and agencies are bound to abide by public norms of cooperation, participation, and stewardship.

After all, it is clearly observable that precisely in the area of international economic relations there are large gaps in the formation and administration of justice. Whereas within the Western national states the expansion urge of big corporations has in the course of years been curtailed and limited and given a place within a balanced whole of social legislation, environmental legislation, the right of competition, and the like, outside the national territory the right of the strongest is still often determinative. Trade organizations do exist on the international level, but they are often insufficiently or inadequately active. In

important respects, the market economy of the 19th century is still dominant in the world economy of the 20th century. It is precisely for the countries of the Third World that this is the most damaging to both culture and nature. The voluntary adoption of rules, as is (under the auspices of the UN) undertaken by multinational corporations, is a nice gesture, yet it is more of an illustration of the lack of public formation of law than would be the elimination of rules. The argument that the countries of the Third World themselves should, by means of their national states, provide for this lack of the public formation of law - including that of a national policy for protection of the environment and the prevention of the exhaustion of their own supply of raw materials - is of course hardly or not at all tenable. They cannot do that for the simple reason that most of them remain too much dependent on the Western corporations, which are established and producing in their land, and on the possibility of attracting Western capital whenever necessary. Of a weak party one may not expect that at his own initiative he is able to compete against economic and political superpowers and, moreover, is able to bridle and tame them. Furthermore, one may not lose sight of the fact that outside the territory of both the countries of the Third World and that of the First and Second Worlds there are the world oceans, where the hunt for raw materials is still very much a free-for-all. Wherever the economic power goes, there justice *must* go along to correct that power and where necessary also to limit and restrain it. But that implies at the same time the necessity of an international order of *justice*, which is able to issue regulative and binding directives [239] on the basis of public norms of justice in international economic relations, wherein, moreover, the peoples of all countries by means of their government can participate and achieve cooperation, and within the framework of which all who are involved with the global duty of being good stewards of all that is created can be, more than now, serious about their task.

In connection with the norms indicated above and the concrete evils which from their perspective can be detected in the present day international economic relations, the formation of an international public system of laws appears necessary. Preferably it would contain the following elements:

- a. **A world conservation policy which**
 - i. can determine the rate at which the raw materials and energy in the earth

may be depleted;

ii. can make reserves for the benefit of poor and needy states within the existing national raw materials and energy reserves of other countries;

iii. includes a binding policy regarding the exploitation of the world oceans, whether without or within the framework of rules pertaining to common possessions;

iv. makes possible a supranational effort in the struggle against erosion, especially in the Third World countries (cf. part 3, a, i);

b. i. can adopt binding measures toward nations and the residents of nations relative to the pollution of seas and oceans; and to

ii. the storing and distribution of world food supplies which are bought in rich harvest years (cf. part 3, a, ii);

c. i. contains different criteria for distribution concerning the circulation of new world money (SCR's, the so-called "special link", whereby the richer countries are consciously being handicapped in the possibility of spending relative to the poorer countries); and

ii. a limited world tax system on states and multinational corporations according to ability, also for the financing of the world conservation policy mentioned under a (cf. part 3, a, iii);

d. i. includes a gradual but compulsory abolishment of [240] existing interest and repayment obligations on all loans to third world countries; and

ii. the orientation of support and help programs to the realization of basic needs - but then in accordance with the principles of self-reliance, established by the recipient countries themselves; and

iii. the abolishment of all protective rights toward products out of developing countries on Western markets, whereby the Western countries artificially perpetuate and enlarge their own "closedness" and privileges in the international territorial division; and

iv. an internationally enforced law concerning unacceptable behavior of Western corporations within the countries of Third World, whereby it must be possible to apply international sanctions and the adjudication¹² in international courts (cf. part 3, b).

e. Giving a full voice to the countries of the Third World to the extent that they can still act as a unity, on the manner of the formation of the international order of society; the admission of direct representatives from the Third World countries in the European parliament and other European and Atlantic communal institutions (cf. part, c).

The above elements are intended as illustrative rather than definitive. They remain limited

in character because we have kept in mind here the extent to which governments (together) can go in their *own* responsibility. Considerably broader therefore is the appeal that ought to go out to the nations of the world as such, whereby in the Western world the societal organizations, businesses, families and churches constitute possible addressees. In this appeal it must be clearly heard that a growth of material prosperity which has been given independent status, with an autonomously advancing production technology as its indispensable lackey, both threatens happiness in the Western countries themselves and is the basis for the injustice and the reckless exploitation of nature which causes particularly the poorer countries of the Third World to suffer.

In the following paragraphs (section B) an attempt will be made to elaborate the above as regards three instances. Successively we shall deal with:

the problem of world control of raw materials (part 5);

the ambivalence of Western help to developing countries (part 6);

the lesson of South Africa for the problems of the world of tomorrow (part 7).

¹² The term used here appears to be the result of a typographical mis-correction: "irad-judication".

B. Putting It Into Practice

5. The Problem of Global Control of Raw Materials

Speaking about justice in the international economic order, it is first of all necessary to inquire as to the meaning of the concept of justice in this context..

It concerns justice in our earthly affairs. Through the idea of justice man sees himself placed in a structure which orders every area of life, at least ought to do that: the relations among men mutually, between men and the human associations from that of marriage and family to that of the state and world society. Justice and order(ing) constitute therefore an unbreakable connection.

Likewise justice and equality are closely related. The concern here is not the formal, but the material equality, that is, the proportional or distributive equality.

Now the question arises as to the norm(s) according to which equal distribution is to be practiced. In answering this question we arrive at the presuppositions, at the religious principles which determine how one stands and how one wants to live in this world.

That all people are equal (in value) finds its deepest ground in the fact that God created all after his image. From his createdness in God's image, man, in his relationships and claims, derives the right to life and provisions for it, as well as the right to be in charge of these matters. This includes the right to be a happy youth, a decent and normal upbringing, and physical development.

The next question is: what is there to be distributed? In principle, the whole earth. God created the whole earth and afterward entrusted it to the *man* and in him to all mankind to keep and to work with it. The creation exists thus for all (individuals, groups/peoples, nations) - the earth and its fullness, that is, the earth and whatever is on it and in it (minerals), and whatever is in the waters (the oceans!), and whatever is in the earth under the water (minerals).

On the national and international level the above brings us to the question concerning the righteous distribution of wealth, or stated differently: how must the scarce means, or those which can be used for more than one purpose, be justly divided on the global level?¹³. The answer must be that all must receive their equal share, and that in a way that everyone can freely and equally do with three things as he pleases - in equal shares, because the concern here is not equality in a juridical sense, in other words, all the same equality; it is not a matter of all the same amount on the basis of equality, but all according to the measure of fairness thought ought to be practiced with this kind of distribution on the basis of equity (see among others Schachter, "The definition of a new

13 Editor's note: What is designated as footnote 10 in the text is footnote 8 in list of footnotes. It read as follows: (8) Nationally and internationally this problem has received attention for some decades already. To be distinguished here are on the one hand, the question concerning the norms, the starting points for such a division and, on the other hand, the ways and structures by means of which that is to be realized.

In most writings these two questions are randomly discussed. The literature cited here, particularly the extensive documentation of the United Nations, is meant to introduce the reader to a much broader consideration of this subject than can be done in this presentation.

- De Waart, P. J. I. M. "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources as a Cornerstone for International Economic Rights and Duties" in Meyers and Vierdag eds **Essays on International Law and Relations in Honor of A. J. P. Thomas**. Leyden, Sythoff, 1977. This book has also appeared as a double issue of the *Netherlands International Law Review* (Vol XXIV, special issue 1977, 1 and 2).
- Kapteyn, P. J. G. and E. P. Wallenstein **De Nieuwe Internationale Economische Orde, Preadviezen voor de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Internationale Recht** Deventer 1977
- Kooijmans, P.H **Volkenrecht en Sociale Gerechtigheid** Leiden 1965 [253]
- Schachter, Oscar **Sharing the World's Resources** New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
- Skillen, James, "International Justice: Is it Possible?" *International Reformed Bulletin* 18(62/63):1-17 (1975).
- Tinbergen, Jan, coordinator. **Rio: Reshaping the International Order: A Report to the Club of Rome** Amsterdam 1976. A Dutch edition appeared, also in 1976, under the title, **Naar een Rechtvaardiger Internationale Orde**.
- Van der Molen, Gesina H. J. **Norm en Praktijk in de Internationale Samenleving**. Kampen 1962.
- A special project on this subject is at the moment in the process of completion in the Netherlands, under the editorship of Dr. P. Verloren van Themaat. The series is entitled **Studies over Internationaal Economisch Recht**, and it is divided into the following publications:
- I.1 *De Verenigde Naties en de internationale economische orde*.
- I.2 *Organisaties en problemen op het gebied van de internationale handel*
- I.3 (a) *Organisaties op het gebied van het internationale monetair stelsel en de ontwikkelings-financiering: Monetaire organisaties*
 (b) *Organisaties op het gebied van het Internationale monetair stelsel en de ontwikkelings-financiering : Financierings-organisaties*
- I.4 *Transcontinentale en subcontinentale regionale organisaties*
- I.5 *Oceaanregime, milieuproblematiek, voedsel - en bevolkingsvraagstukken*
- II *Juridische grondslagen van een nieuwe internationale economische orde*
- Part I appeared in its entirety in 1977. Part II, written by Verloren van Themaat, will appear in 1978. An introductory study has appeared as *Mededeling van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afdeling Letterkunde*, in the *Nieuwe Reeks* - part 39 No 3, Amsterdam 1976; P Verloren van Themaat, **De taak van de rechtswetenschap bij de planning van internationale economische integratie**.

international economic order in the UN declaration on this subject begins with" 'Based on Equity ...").

Besides the above, the first and great as well as the second [242] commandment to love God above all and the neighbour as oneself remain unabatedly true. From that it may be inferred that man's freedom and equality are also limited by the position of the neighbor(s). Thus man also possesses a responsibility toward the community.

Looking at the present world situation, one must notice that it lacks completely the possibility of this kind of distribution.

a. In the first place there is a great lack of freedom, both formally and materially. Two-thirds of the world population mostly lacks what is essential for sustenance. On account of these shortages - also as they experience it themselves - in clothing, nutrition, and shelter, these people, though perhaps formally free, are certainly not existentially free. In addition, there is a large lack of political freedom.

b. In the second place there exists too large an *un-equality*. As a result of the economic-technical development in the industrialized world the rest of the world, though perhaps formally equal, is not economically equal.

c. A specific third factor, which weights very heavily, concerns raw materials and resources,. These are controlled by the national states and they are the subject of property relations and property contracts. Next to the economic and technical domination, there is also the (inter)national juridical structure which - certainly in its present form - makes the resources inaccessible for many. At this moment the world remains ordered in such a way that national sovereignty remains oriented to national interests or to the interests of the bloc to which it belongs. One is not, therefore, really capable of listening to those who are weaker.

That which was stated under a, b, and c above is what one finds on the global level, but what one can also find on the national level in many countries. This lack of freedom and un-equality are the result of the developments in technology which occurred in a relatively small part of the world, and built an economic position of power, particularly

through the concentration of capital and of the power to control and decide.

This economic and political position of power involves great consequences for the future. In the present world situation it is exclusively the rich and the powerful countries which are able to open up and utilize the remaining resources and supplies of raw materials. But this will increasingly be done at the expense of the economically less powerful. With Brunner it should be said here too, particularly from a Christian vision, "the wealth of the rich is unjust if it makes the poverty of others necessary" and "a just or even only a peaceful order of nations is incompatible with the economic imperialism of the large powers, that is, the use of the power of the state for the preservation or the acquisition of economic advantages. The most absolute liberation of the world economy [243] from the grip of power politics is one of the most pressing postulates of justice among the nations."

We need, therefore, at least a world plan for the economy within which, given the responsibility for each other in this world and simultaneously given the freedom and equality by which every individual people or nation can develop according to its own direction or its own character, the access to the earth in its fullest sense is equally open for all and is regulated, and within which the exploitation of the earth is limited and regulated for all. This means that the nations that are now powerful and rich will have to make sacrifices, that they will have to accept lower standards of living. Failing to do that, the future looks sombre. "If a free society cannot save the many who are poor it cannot save either the few who are rich" (John F Kennedy).

It will be necessary, therefore, that the national sovereignty of the states will at least be opened up and oriented to the interests of the world. For then the norm of justice will be able to do its work within the existing jurisdiction and ownership relationships on the world level. Next to it there are those parts of the earth which are not directly subject to a national sovereignty, but which are known as "the common heritage of mankind", for instance, the world oceans and their riches: food, manganese, minerals. As concerns their control and exploitation, at the moment there remain economic-technical barriers that are insuperable for many countries. At least in this respect there would have to come a world structure in order that this common possession may be managed and distributed according to the indicated norms, for all and by all.

In this way something could be realised of what President Roosevelt aimed at under point 3 of his famous "Four Freedoms Speech" to the American congress on the 6th of January 1941: "The third is freedom from want - which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peace-time life for its inhabitants - everywhere in the world." And he added in the conclusion of the same address: "The world order which we seek is the cooperation of free countries, working together in a friendly, civilized society."

Eight months later (August 14, 1941¹⁴) President Roosevelt and Winston S Churchill formulated in the so-called Atlantic Charter two principles in the national politics of both their countries, on which principles "they base their hopes for a better future for the world": "Fourth, they will endeavour with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great and small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security."

[244] The international regulation of the management and disposal of our earth and its fullness, based on justice, is the condition for a peaceable international society. After all, justice and peace mutually include each other.

6. The Ambivalence of Western Development Help

Development help, as this was and is being given by Western countries, has from the beginning had an ambivalent character - and that in more than one respect. In the first place, there is the ambivalence that much "help" continues to be given by means of loans with high interest rates and repayment obligations, as well as with conditions obligating the recipients to spend the money in the country of the donor. It is clear that hereby problems of short duration are "resolved" by creating problems of a much longer duration. The debt load of the countries of the third World still increases, and slowly it can lead their weak economies to the breaking point.

In the second place - and this goes much deeper - the nature of the development help as such also shows a certain ambivalence. With respect to that development help, which is prompted by considerations of justice or mercy and which is given freely and "for nothing", there is always nevertheless an element of Western self-interest. With Zylstra¹⁵ it is best formulated in this way: development help can also be regarded as a premium of Western countries on the preparedness of a developing country to participate in an international division of labor, which participation results in a negative rather than a positive balance of payments for the developing country. The development help is then the financial compensation which stands over against this worsening balance of payment situation.

This approach may seem exaggerated, but it has nevertheless a basis in reality. Raoul Prebisch has drawn attention to the fact - and his conception has later received scientific support from S. B. Linder - that in the international trade the countries of the Third World, on account of their package of export (agrarian products, raw materials), are hardly or not at all able to profit from the advantages of international trade. In monetary value, their export remains on the average behind that of the export of the industrialized nations. But at the same time their own economic growth does create a considerable need for import, which therefore cannot be sufficiently covered by the profits of the export. Thus a structural shortage in the balance of payments arises which must be met by money from the outside, particularly development help. Viewed from this perspective, development help is thus the price which the rich countries of the world must pay to stimulate the nations of the Third World to achieve the growth and the export which the rich West considers desirable. That such help is initially given and later again reduced is secondary: a Third world country which aims at fast growth and opens itself up to the world market cannot so easily make that choice undone later.

[245] The question is, however, whether in this way justice and the economy in a world context is really being promoted. The Third World countries which receive that development help thereby receive, to be sure, the possibility to - initially - achieve their

14 Original has 1949

15 Originally this read "Zeylstra" but would appear to refer to Bernard Zylstra, noted in footnote 4 (2) above.

own economic growth (which may be bitterly necessary), but they also become subject to the vulnerability of the world market. Due to the increase of oil prices India has lost more (in the form of more expensive imports) than it has received since the Second World War by way of development help. The severity of the famine in the Sahel countries was partly due to the fact that the still-remaining fertile areas were used for the growing of crops for export to the richer countries, crops which had no nutritional value whatever for the native population. Furthermore, an undeniable price for joining the world market is that a developing country adopts the Western style of technology and therewith also the Western principle of modernization. And finally there is the rate of exchange aspect of the international trade. Most lands of the Third World keep their limited monetary reserves in dollars, as these are the most frequently used international means of payment. But every dollar outside the United States, which most likely will also remain outside the United States and be used elsewhere as a means of payment, implies implicitly a special advantage for the wealthiest economy of this world. The expansion of American business in the countries of Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa could be so fast because the American export of capital could be done in dollars which, as concerns America as a whole, cost little or nothing more than their cost of production (printing costs and the like). In their essay, "De Internationale Monetaire Orde" (The International Monetary Order), included as appendix 1 in their **RIO Report**, Tinbergen, Duncan Ndewegwa and Robert Triffin provide further and dismaying data about this. The world reserves expressed in dollars, so they say, "had more than doubled from the end of 1969 until the end of 1972, so that during the short period of three years they have more sharply increased than during all preceding years and centuries since Adam and Eve." Through the adoption of their currency as international means of payment, the industrialized countries were from 1970 to 1974 favoured with an amount of 92 billion dollars, which is the same amount as the total gross world monetary reserve at the end of 1970. During that same period, international reserves were officially created (especially in the form of special drawing rights) which for an amount of 96 billion dollars benefited the nations of the Third World.

The picture that emerges from all these data is the picture of a wealthy Western world which increasingly enriches itself through its economic power, with the Third World countries at best receiving the crumbs that fall from their table. It is not surprising,

therefore, that the Third World countries more and more emphasize the necessity of self-reliance - achieving their development by their own power and in their own way, both nationally and by the formation of blocs (collective self-reliance). They look at development help with eyes different now than some decades ago. It is money that binds instead of liberating them. The second aspect of the Biblical idea of [246] justice, mentioned in part c above, - the restoration of life everywhere, whereby people and nations can freely fulfil their own calling - is just about totally lacking in Western development help. Sometimes it makes one think of what the Bible says about the mercies of the godless: "The mercy of the godless is cruel, says the Lord."

Points of contact for actual justice toward the poor countries will therefore have to be sought and found in a different manner than is done now. A *first* point of contact is the revision of rules according to which new world money (SDR's) is distributed by the IMF to the countries of the world. (see further on this the significant doctoral dissertation of R.L. Haan, **An Inquiry into the Monetary Aspects of a Link Between Special Drawing Rights and Development Finance** (Amsterdam 1971)). The effect of it may be that the wealthy industrialized nations are compelled to go in the direction of a more modest growth and expenditure pattern, while the poorer countries are given the means by which they can better attack, according to their own insight, the internal problems of great poverty and unemployment. A *second* point of contact lies in the earlier noted possibility of eliminating from the help already provided the obligations of interest repayment, thereby lightening the debt of the countries of the Third World. Were not also the debts of the poor in ancient Israel freed from interest, while after seven years - through the law of the sabbatical year - these debts were declared cancelled, that is, no longer able to be demanded legally (cf. Leviticus 25:36-37, Deuteronomy 15:1&2)? A *third* point of contact lies in the international division of labor itself, which requires our further attention.

It is true of the international division of labor itself that thinking about it in terms of the ultimately envisioned *future goals* can stand in the way of, or at least partially dislodge, the more direct approach from the standpoint of fundamental basic norms - and their evident violation. Therefore, it may be meaningful, from the perspective of the norms of stewardship, justice, and good social associations, mentioned in part c above, to try to

indicate how a responsible international division of labor should and must look. Expressed in general principals this would at least have to satisfy the following requirements.

i. It may not result in a total depletion of the country's own raw materials and energy potential - which, among others, limits the activity of Western businesses in Third World countries (part 3, a, i).

ii. As regards Third World countries, it may not be made subservient or subject to the consumptive whims of the rich Western consumers - the dangers of too large a sales volume, certainly where it concerns mono-cultures (3, ii, and iii).

iii. It ought to rest on a preparedness by the rich Western countries to slow down their own growth in order to lessen the demand of scarce raw materials in the world as a whole (3, a, iii).

[247] iv. It may not depend on advantages, maintained by the misuse of power and defended by protective rights, of the wealthy Western countries in the production of the world industry (3, b).

v. It may not be forced upon developing countries who, on account of self-reliance, prefer their own staggered provision particularly for the internal market, with culturally adapted technologies (3, c).

vi. It ought to be reviewed on the basis of international agreements (including agreements regarding raw materials and funds) in which the developing countries themselves participate (3, c, i).

vii. It presupposes on the other hand that the developing countries themselves - however understandably - do not withdraw into their self-reliance as into a bastion by which they also, on a longer term, screen themselves off from every element of world labor division (3, c, ii).

Each of these seven points could mean a greater or smaller step forward in the

direction of more just world economic relations. Hence also as individual steps, they each have their own values, and each include their own form of appeal to the nations of this world and their deciding agencies.

Thinking from the perspective of *norms* creates the greatest certainty concerning the steps which ought to be made at the *beginning*: the thinking from the perspective of future goals renders uncertain precisely those first steps which ought to be taken. However, in thinking and acting from the perspective of norms, the final future remains considerably more vague than in thinking from the perspective of goals. (This holds at least on paper; after all, how many goals that were set have ever been achieved?) yet if we should begin with turning in these - and comparable other - concrete directions, the question arises whether anything at all can then be said about the possible structure of the world society.

The best characterization of such a world society that might possibly emerge - whose more specific content we shall consciously omit - would be that of a decentralized responsibility. To clarify that characterization it may be meaningful to contrast it with two other possible types of constructing the world society - decentralized freedom and centralized responsibility.

The type first mentioned - decentralized autonomous freedom - is the basic idea of the capitalistic structure of society; the second type - centralized responsibility - is the basic idea of a socialistic or communistic societal structure. With the first type, economic production is a matter of individual pursuit of profit. Businesses that are organized on the basis of a return on their capital investment have the freedom to create and open up markets wherever they [248] wish, for it is the market which at least in theory forces them to be competitive with other business. This, again at least in theory, keeps the prices down, lowers the costs, and thereby benefits the consumer (which is everyone).

In contrast, the community type starts from the sole power of the "community" over all the means of production. Here the starting point is not individual autonomous freedom, but collective control. This collective, planned control - likewise according to autonomous criteria, but now determined and designed by the "community" - is supposed to be the best guarantee both for the certainty of the future growth of prosperity and for the

certainty of sufficient work opportunity for all and the social security of all. This is how the community expresses her "responsibility toward all".

In both societal types the idea of autonomy constitutes the basis, whether of the actions of the individual or of the actions of the state "on behalf of the community". There is no real place for honouring outside, heteronomous norms for life in society; the autonomous purposes determine the process and its result. Therefore, capitalism and communism have each their own ideologies, their complexes of values by which the predetermined goals are mentally supported and again and again "justified". Responsibility in the proper sense of the term - as the response, in terms of given norms, to God and the neighbour - is, therefore, hardly found in either, just as freedom in the proper sense of the term - the opportunity to respond to God and the neighbor, also in social economic relations - is continually and fundamentally threatened in both. Autonomy in a created world does not lead to real solutions; it brings societies into dead-end alleys of dialectics. It is therefore not surprising that, for instance, within the capitalistic type of society one can observe a forced development from decentralized "freedom" toward centralized "responsibility". The unlimited market expansion by business has made it necessary for governments in the Western countries to become increasingly involved in economic processes. Necessary government involvement in business had to be combined with the government getting involved in providing employment opportunities, enacting social legislation, the regulation of personal income and that of business, and coming with necessary regulations to protect the environment. Within the capitalistic economies there is an evolution toward an increasingly greater government control; for that matter, one can observe an opposite evolution from central control toward individual autonomy in the industrialized communist lands. The convergence of the systems of East and West is no coincidence, but is to a large degree determined by the autonomous character which characterizes both systems.

The consequences which this has also for the international economic order are not difficult to grasp. Here also the dialectical alternation between individual autonomy and central control increasingly threatens to determine the future. The prophetic voices which predict a world government with comprehensive powers of planning [249] might well be right, and the moreso if the individual autonomy of Western business continues to be the

basic pattern for the development or "modernization" of the world.

Therefore, only an adherence to the principles of a *decentralized responsibility* seems to offer a solution here. This principle assumes that the call to responsibility, to listening to and acting according to basic norms, is not the privilege of the "state" (or "the community"), but it is a call which comes to all people and nations in their own work, culture, and situation. This is, therefore, also the justification of the principle of self-reliance: the opposition against dictatorship from the outside concerning the development of the economy, technology, and culture, and the adherence to the right to be able to, and to be allowed to, develop the economy and technology concerning one's own culture and according to one's own responsibility. But at the same time the motif of responsibility implies that autonomy cannot and may not be the deepest motif of self-reliance. It is healthy and safe only if it is related to the mandate of stewardship, to the mandate to practice justice towards those who are vulnerable and disadvantaged in one's own society, and to the mandate of a worldwide cooperation and participation.

This holds for the countries of the Third World, but it holds no less for the Western nations. Not only for the benefit of the Third World, but also for the benefit of our own future, the Western nations must learn - again - to develop a style of culture around a responsible manner of dealing with the economy and technology. Economy and technology are and will remain their tyrants; and the social evils of unemployment, loneliness, and pollution of the environment will continue to increase, as well as the necessity of increasingly larger government intervention, if they should refuse a kind of opening up, a kind of unlocking of economic and technological processes in the direction of the applicable norms: the norms of an actual stewardship, which, relative to the satisfaction of human needs, knows the meaning of the Biblical word "sufficient"; and the norms of a service-rendering production technology, in agreement with human responsibility and creativity.

World systems in East and West converge, but world problems (from the North to the South) do so likewise. The problems of the Third World countries will likely remain insoluble, if the wealthy industrial nations shrink back from coming to grips with their own

problems in terms of their deepest, cultural root.

7. **The Lesson of South Africa**

That in this essay we deal separately with the problems of South Africa does not stem from censoriousness or from the need to chime in with a political fad. This last paragraph deals with South Africa as the experimental polder for the world of tomorrow.

For the interesting thing of this country is that there within [250] the borders of one country, one finds all the vital contrasts within the present day world. South Africa is simultaneously colonizer and colony; the North-South contrast runs right through the country, accentuated even more by the division of property in the Apartheid policy. But in the tumultuous developments in the last few years there has also become visible within the country an East-West contrast: South Africa's industrial capitalism experiences communistic counter-pressure too, which is represented by some as the great alternative for the solution of all South Africa problems. The vulnerable relationship between the races in the world reaches its absolute climax at the moment within the South African society. Finally, the radical consequences of modernization in the midst of traditional tribal cultures are likely most clearly visible within South Africa. South Africa is the world in miniature, a turbulent melting pot. The problems which tomorrow's world as a whole will have to face are already fully present in South Africa. Therefore, whatever for good or ill is emerging in South Africa serves as a sign of hope or of deep disappointment for the world as a whole. Hence likely also the intense interest of that same world for whatever happens in South Africa. Dealing with South Africa - and that without being involved in it as one who is likewise guilty - one is in a sense dealing with one's self and with the future of one's own society and culture.

Hence the question is justified: to what extent in our thinking and speaking relative to worldwide economic relations can one already now learn a lesson from what has happened and is still happening in South Africa? Perhaps that lesson can be summarized in the following points:

- a. It is impossible to maintain one's own styles of culture, even through an artificial

isolation, if at the same time intensive economic relations continue to exist. Characteristic of the South African society is that within it a unique development - in specifically designated areas for that development - of the black tribal nations is being pursued; yet at the same time the colored population is being very intensively involved as available labor in the white industrial areas (particularly in the form of so-called migrant labor). Various investigations have shown that this puts an enormous (modernization) pressure on the cultural awareness of the black population. Culture and economy cannot be separated from each other. Western economic development dominantly entails its own cultural demands, wherever one finds it.

b. Capitalism as a societal system effects only an apparent satisfying integration in a pluriform (world) society. Capitalism has undoubtedly a levelling influence,. Differences in culture and mentality gradually lose their sharp edges; there is a likely combination of "white consciousness" and "black consciousness" in a common "consumer consciousness". Also, under efficiency-oriented capitalism, different rates of payment for qualitatively equal labor cannot forever continue to exist. Those are forms of integration or assimilation; yet at the same time capitalism itself, on account of its origin in the autonomous progress idea of Western man, is ultimately more culture disintegrating [251] than integrating in its effects. The "objectivization" of people, their likely consumption enslavement, and their individualization are evidence not of cultural progress, but of cultural destruction. On this point there is hardly a difference between capitalism and communism.

c. The determination to maintain the goal of a forced and closed preservation of identity or culture is not only no solution, but is also the prelude to the destruction of one's own identity. Among the white population of South Africa the will to maintain one's identity is strongly developed; it can even be regarded as likely the most important root of the Apartheid policy (later modified to a policy of the separate development of each race). When, however, the will to preserve one's identity in a culture becomes the central goal, there emerges - as with every other central goal - ideologizing influences which reorient the awareness of norms. Under the influence of such an ideology, justice easily becomes a justice which discriminates in accordance with racial or national criteria. However, in no national form of society which is organized by the norm of *res publica* can a basic

discrimination be maintained without eventually provoking a reaction, a movement toward restoration of the violated rights. Herein lies at the same time a real threat to the peaceful continuation of one's own culture and national existence as this initially was envisioned. The preservation of life as the ultimate goal entails the possibility of the loss of life. In contrast, whoever dares to risk his life and identity for the sake of others will be able to keep it.

d. In listening to the basic norms of justice and stewardship as well as of participation and cooperation, ways of healing become visible also in divided and broken societies. It is the **Koinonia Declaration** which precisely on this crucial point in South African society has taken a position.

- i. "We believe that freedom sufficient to fulfil one's calling before God is essential ... We believe that justice embraces, inter alia, equity."
- ii. We believe that God is a God of justice, and that his justice is the principle implanted in the hearts and lives of his children. We believe that God should be obeyed by practicing his justice in all spheres of life, and at this time especially in politics., We believe that Christian love, as defined by God's law, supplies the norms for practicing justice. This means having the opportunity of doing unto others as one would have them do unto oneself."
- iii. "We disassociate ourselves from all extreme forms of black and white national consciousness which identify the gospel with the history or group interests of any one group ..."

[252] That is a world which can open up new ways not only for South African society, but also for a world society which are the moment is so much marked by self-interest, ideology, and the will to exercise power and self-preservation.

Norms for the International Economic Order

(A Response)

J. D. van der Vyver

from *Justice in the International Economic Order* 1978 pp. 254-267.

At the dawn of our history the people all spoke the same language and they desired to remain unified and powerful, and so they decided to found a city upon a plain in the land of Shinar, and they started to build a tower with its top in the heavens where they could live together as one people. But God, in His unending wisdom, knew that if all the people of the world were to continue to be one nation with a single language nothing they might have a mind to do would be beyond their reach, and consequently He confused their speech and scattered them all over the face of the earth.

The desire to seek the glorification of the human person in universal political and social structures has from time to time cropped up in various systems of sociological thought; and since the Second World War the urge to transform the world into a Tower of Babel in order to boost human powers seems once again to have captured the minds of man. Would not human envy and egocentric strife be obviated and trans-ethnic understanding and cooperation be greatly fostered if one were to obliterate religious diversities, induce all the peoples of the world to think and live along the lines of the same ethical norms., enforce Esperantism, and subject all the inhabitants of our planet to one central government in a single political society with a common set of juridical norms? What if we could unite the brilliance and consolidate the scientific achievements of all the Einsteins of our time? O, how powerful man would become!

Within the context of Dr. Goudzwaard's lecture the tendency towards internationalism relevant to the economic aspect of reality comes into play. This tendency is evidenced by attempts to merge the supply of material resources, the distribution of wealth, the utilization of labor potentials, the regulation of working conditions, and other economic phenomena within a macrocosmic economic structure.

1. The International Economic Order

Dr. Goudzwaard's address presupposes the present existence, or the need for the future creation, of an international economic order, and I think we ought first of all to reflect on the fundamental nature of such an order.

The history of Babel has led me to believe that all attempts to altogether obliterate ontic varieties - be they religious, ethical, [p. 255] juridical, political, linguistic, national, social, or economic - for the sole purpose of glorifying the supposed excellence of man are opposed to the Will of God and would in any event be futile. Though one ought not to pamper diversities simply for the sake of perpetuating existential differentiations, one should on the other hand respect those limitations of human persons and establishments that are imbedded in creation and have been ordained by God. Any mundane economic arrangement which endeavours to eliminate or to ignore fundamental varieties within the structures of our temporal existence would inevitably lose track of reality. I would, however, vouch for an international economic order taking cognisance of, and based upon respect for, *inter alia*, national, cultural, and ethnic peculiarities, but which at the same time seeks to overcome the variances, discrepancies, and dissension that have resulted from the disruption of mankind.

I hasten to emphasize that Dr. Goudzwaard did not advocate a Tower of Babel type of international economic order. In his analysis of various future models he in fact seems to have opposed the idea of an egalitarian world order; and elsewhere he regretted the current destruction of cultures in Third World countries. In the paragraph dealing with "the international community as the nodal point of norm-realization"¹⁶ it became clear that he envisaged an order of co-operating national states or national governments. And that the international economic order - as he sees it - is destined to operate within the ambit of a trans-national community of states. Dr. Goudzwaard is therefore obviously not in favor of the elimination of political entities, but has sought the formula for a system of economic cooperation which would cut across, but would nevertheless retain, the empirical stance of national diversities.

Dr Goudzwaard did, however, opt for the construction of international institutions and stressed the need for the creation of an international juridical order for the purpose of sanctioning the norms which in his opinion ought to obtain within the international economic order. In this respect Dr Goudzwaard's idealism may have exceeded the bounds of practicability.

There are various problems that will, in my opinion, hamper the introduction and implementation of an international economic order founded upon a system of juridical coercion. Those problems all stem from the essential foundational structure of international alliances.

A juridical order of the kind favoured by Dr Goudzwaard - that is an international *public* legal order - presupposes the existence of a communal relationship¹⁷ of states, and in particular an organized community¹⁸ founded upon an historical form of organization and embracing the entire domain to be subjected to such an international order. As such the international public legal order must essentially display three basic characteristics: first, an organized solidary unity of its constituent parts; secondly, an inherent relationship [256] of authority and subordination; and thirdly, relative continuity that would remain unaffected

¹⁶ Editor's Comment: "The International Society as the Junction of Norm Realization" pp. 18-25 [236-240]. As with the Skillen quote mentioned below, fn. 41, this might indicate that the conference participants in their presentations had access to earlier versions of this paper.

¹⁷ The footnotes to van der Vyver's "Response" are found on pages 265-267. (1) In the neo-Calvinistic philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) the various social phenomena have been classified mainly into *communal* and *inter-individual* or *inter-communal* relations. The former term signifies a durable social relationship in which the members find themselves joined into a communal unity. The latter term signifies a relatively loose relationship in which individuals or communities function in coordination, but without being united into a solidary whole; for instance, the relationship between friends, neighbours, enemies, or contracting parties. Cf H. Dooyeweerd, **A New Critique of Theoretical Thought** (Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1952-8), III, pp. 177-8; **Verkenningen in de Wijsbegeerte, de Sociologie en de Rechtsgeschiedenis** (Amsterdam, 1962), p. 110; **De Strijd om het Souvereiniteit in de Moderne Rechts- en Staatsleer** (Amsterdam, 1950), p. 55; **De Modale Structuur van het Juridische Oorzaelijkheidsverband** (Amsterdam, 1952), p. 41.

¹⁸ (2) Dooyeweerd subdivided communal relations into *organized communities* and *unorganised* or *natural communities*. Natural communities are based upon consanguinity, and they comprise the union of husband and wife and of the cognate family both in the narrow sense of a set of parents and their children and in the broader sense of including all degrees of kinship. Organized communities lack the biotic foundation that binds the members of a natural community together, but are founded upon an historical form of organization, and they include churches, schools, corporations, clubs, states, etc. Cf. Dooyeweerd **A New Critique of Theoretical Thought** III, pp. 178-182; **Verkenningen in de Wijsbegeerte, de Sociologie en de Rechtsgeschiedenis**, p. 111.

by the entry and exit of members.¹⁹

a. Structural Unity

It must at the outset be noted that an international *public* legal order would have more to it than the structural framework of present-day international law. Though international law is usually regarded as a subdivision of public law - that is the case simply because the subjects of international law happen to be states or governments - it in reality operates on the level of inter-individual or inter-communal²⁰ agreement, and as such it lacks the organized social make-up of a truly public community and in fact by analogy takes rank with private-law relations. An international economic order backed by a public system of international laws would, on the contrary, require the founding of an organized community that would unite all the nations of the world into a single solidary whole.

During the post-war era there have been deliberate attempts to transform the United Nations and certain specialized agencies (such as the International Labour Organization) and regional institutions (such as the European Economic Community) into trans-national organized communities that could provide the structural foundation for effective law-enforcement, but the outcome of those attempts have so far, generally speaking, been quite unimpressive. The failures and frustrations of the post-war entrepreneurs of a juridically-based economic world order are perhaps attributable to the fact that the establishment of international organized communities requires (*inter alia*) a certain measure of homogeneity amongst the component parts of such communities. That is probably why regional organizations seem to flourish more readily than all-embracing international institutions, and why - within the ranks of regional organizations - the efforts of the European Community to implement a system of trans-national human rights enforcement and economic cooperation have been far more successful than similar endeavours on the Arab league, the organization of African Unity, and the Organization of American States.

¹⁹ (3) It may be noted in passing that Dooyeweerd's analysis of the different types of social phenomena is somewhat confusing, since he does not seem to distinguish between a social relationship as such and social entities that operate as "things" Whereas a social relationship belongs to the category of dynamic events or occurrences, a social entity - such as a church, school, state, etc - has a particular substance, or as H. G. Stoker (b. 1899) would call it, an idiostantic structure..

²⁰ (4) See footnote 1 above.

b. Internal Authority

A legal norm must accommodate within itself the structural essence of the juridical aspect of reality, which, according to the neo-Calvinistic legal philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), is to be found in the modal aspect of retribution in the sense of "an irreducible mode of balancing and harmonizing individual and social interests."²¹ It is also of the essence of a law in the juridical sense that the enforcement of the appropriate retributory consequences that ought to follow upon any change in the legal order must be backed by some form of coercion to be imposed by the repository of the power of compulsion within the particular area of jurisdiction of the legal system concerned. The foundational substrate of the law accordingly [257] include a potent power-structure at the base of its implementation machinery which must secure the enforcement of retribution on all instances where the legal order has been disturbed by the occurrence of a legal fact.²²

The establishment of an adequate trans-national power structure to enforce the retributory function of the law within the context of an international public legal system presents perhaps as great a challenge as the mere organizing of political community relationships destined to transcend national borders. A brief glance at the implementation machinery of present-day international institutions²³ will suffice to demonstrate the relative impotency of international manipulators of juridical authority.

- i. The major deterrent at the disposal of the General Assembly and the various organs of the United Nations has been restricted to the adverse affects of public debate.
- ii. When a situation exists which is found to constitute a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, the Security Council may indeed, by virtue of chapter VII of the UN Charter, direct member states of the United Nations to constrain the culprit state by means of an economic boycott; the interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other media of communication; and/or the severance of diplomatic relations; and in extreme cases even by means of armed intervention; but superficial politicising, national self-interest, and the application of

²¹ (5) **A New Critique of Theoretical Thought** II, p. 129.

²² (6) It must be emphasized that retribution is not to be equated with punishment for wrongdoing. Retribution in the sense of punishment and private laws sanctions will, of course, follow upon a wrongful act, but retribution in its widest juridical meaning also serves to restore order in the legal sense after a lawful act, a natural occurrence, or a lasting condition has taken place or has set in. For instance, if A dies this fact disturbs the legal equilibrium, and in order to once again balance the interests affected by A's death, the law, in the process of retribution, causes A's legal personality to come to an end, his marriage to dissolve, his property to be transferred to his heirs, etc.

²³ (7) For a brief summary of the most important implementation machinery for the international enforcement of human-rights protection, see J.D van der Vyver **Seven Lectures on Human Rights** (Cape Town/ Wynberg/ Johannesburg, 1976), p. 125ff.

double standards have to a great extent neutralized the potential impact of these more spectacular means of retribution.

iii. Though members states of the United nations are, in terms of article 94 (1) of the UN Charter, obliged to comply with decisions of the International Court of Justice that may concern them, it would appear that the Court cannot enforce the execution of its own judgments but that an aggrieved party to an international lawsuit may call upon the security Council to authorize such measures as the Council may regard expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the Court's decision.

iv. Stripped of all fanciful phrasing the implementation machinery provided for in the international conventions and covenants for the protection of human rights that have been sponsored by the United Nations, such as the **Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights** 1966, the **Covenant on Civil, and Political Rights** 1966, the **Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination** 1967, and the **Covenant on the Suppression and the Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid** 1973, add up to no more than General Assembly debates and adverse publicity.

v. Within the family of regional organizations the most imaginative experiment in international human rights protection is the one [258] sanctioned by the **European Convention on Human Rights** 1953, which provides for a procedure whereby instances of human rights infringements can finally be tried by the European Court in Strasbourg, the judgments of which are binding and enforceable against those member states that have subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and a Committee of Ministers having been entrusted with the task of supervising the execution of the Court's decisions.

vi. As far as specialized agencies are concerned, mentioned can be made of the implementation machinery of the International Labour organization: the efforts of the ILO to enforce its conventions are again restricted to a reporting and a non-adversary procedure that could at the most incite unfavourable publicity, and an adversary procedure aimed at the pacific settlement of labour disputes but which may lead to a complain being lodged with the International Court of Justice.

It must again be emphasized that participation in the activities, and the subjection of states to the disciplinary measures or international institutions such as those mentioned above rests entirely on voluntary agreement and can therefore not be equated to the public system of law enforcement championed by Dr. Goudzwaard. The problems experienced in contemporary international law with regard to law enforcement may nevertheless serve as a clear illustration of the immense challenges that would obstruct the creation of a potent power-structure within the context of an international public legal order.

c. Relative Continuity

If the nations of the world could be persuaded to enter into an international economic order that would cause their subordination to a public system of international law, organizing the concerned community on the basis of relative perdurability would perhaps be the least of the difficulties involved. The problem of doing so is nevertheless not

entirely negligible.

Whereas the subordination of the subjects of a state to the legal system of the body politic does not depend upon the free discretion of the subjects themselves, the opposite would be true in the case of members of an international economic order. This is another way of saying that national states are institutional communities,²⁴ that is, communities "which by their inner nature are destined to encompass their members to an intensive degree, continuously or at least for a considerable part of their life, and such in a way independent of their will"²⁵ while an international community of states, being a non-institutional organization, will necessarily display the characteristics of a voluntary association in that its membership shall be based on the principle of freedom to join and to resign. By assuming a public law function and public authority delegated to it by the various states, an international economic order may - as Dr. Goudzwaard in fact seems [259] to have suggested - be modelled after what Dooyeweerd preferred to call compulsory organizations²⁶ - that is, organizations the membership of which is greatly influenced by external compulsion in the sense that factors, such as the right to share in the decisions affecting their interests or to influence public legal relations or to share in other privileges within the area of the organization's sphere of competencies, may compel persons to become or to remain members. Dooyeweerd emphasized that the "compulsion" attached to membership of such organizations does not arise from the inner structure of the relevant community, and he hastened to add that "the joining and leaving of the members of an association as such remains free"²⁷ - provided, of course, that the persons or governments involved shall be prepared to forfeit the vital privileges of membership.

Although external compulsion may induce states eligible for membership to join and to remain within an international economic order, there are, on the other hand, various considerations that may influence certain governments not to do so. I shall call attention to only one such consideration, namely the reluctance of governments to subordinate their national sovereignty to the supreme authority of an international alliance.

²⁴ (8) Cf. Dooyeweerd, **A New Critique of Theoretical Thought**, III, pp. 187-190; **Verkenningen in de Wijsbegeerte, de Sociologie en de Rechtsgeschiedenis**, p. 112,

²⁵ (9) Dooyeweerd, **A New Critique of Theoretical Thought** III, p. 187

²⁶ (10) Dooyeweerd *ibid* p. 190

For the sake of maintaining their internal legislative sovereignty, many countries of the world have taken the view that international treaties to which they become parties would not be self-executing within the territory of their respective domestic jurisdictions.²⁸ This is also the case in, for instance, the United Kingdom and other countries belonging to the British Empire, including Canada where the rule was stated in the following terms: "Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing domestic law, required legislative action. Unlike some other countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law."²⁹

The idea of parliamentary sovereignty is perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the British legal system, and one which poses serious problems when it comes to the participation of the United Kingdom in international ventures. By subscribing to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1953, and by entering into the European Economic Community on 1 January 1973, the United Kingdom did in fact contract international obligations to honor libertarian and economic principles within its borders, but had to do so with tedious circumspection, and not without a touch of self-deception, in order to maintain the pretences of an unimpaired sovereign legislature. As far as the United Kingdom's involvement in the EEC is concerned, section 2 (1) of the **European Communities Act 1972**³⁰ provides that "enforceable Community rights", that is "all such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the treaties, 'are to be given legal effect with the United Kingdom' as in accordance with the Treaties"; and section 3 of the Act instructs the Courts to treat Community law as it would treat domestic law.³¹

²⁷ (11) *ibid*

²⁸ (12) This simply means that the provisions of an international treaty which has been adopted by a government do not automatically form part of the internal law of that particular state, but must first be specifically enacted by the local legislature in order to become domestic law.

²⁹ (13) **Attorney-General for Canada vs Attorney-General for Ontario** (1937) AC 326 at 347 (per Lord Atkin).

³⁰ (14) c 68.

³¹ (15) As to the problems encountered by the United Kingdom upon its joining the EEC, see P. J. G. Kapteyn and P. Verloren van Themaat **Introduction to the Law of the European Communities**

[260] The point in issue is therefore that even though external or indirect influences may be brought to bear upon governments to join the proposed international economic order and thereby to subject themselves to its enactments - even at the expense of their sovereign authority over strictly domestic matters - membership of such an order would not and could never be automatic; and although the characteristic of organised communities now under consideration - i.e. that of relative continuity - does not require involuntary membership, the expediency of the means of coercion to be employed within the proposed international economic order would furthermore be greatly hampered if the member states were to remain capable of abandoning their membership at will. One may in this regard be reminded of the notorious Greece Case which came before the Council of Europe following the political unrest of 1968 in that country and which led to the withdrawal of Greece on 12 December 1969 from membership of the Council of Europe after it had become apparent that a majority of the eighteen member countries represented in the Council would vote in favor of the Greek government's suspension from the Council pending its return to a system of parliamentary democracy.

2. Models and Norms

Dr. Goudzwaard has drawn a commendable distinction between what he elected to call "models" and "norms". Models can perhaps be defined as theoretical blueprints for the future, whereas so-called norms refer back to basic principles ordained by God and which ought to apply to any given situation.

Although Dr. Goudzwaard recognised the value of, and to some extent even the need for, scientific involvement in future planning based upon preconceived objectives, he in general subscribed to the view that political, social, and economic scientists ought not to concern themselves with speculative idealism; and I must admit that I agree with the general trend of his scepticism in this regard, though perhaps for different reasons.

Dr. Goudzwaard did in fact endorse Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker's plea for the participation of social and political scientists in the fight against generally recognized evils

after the Accession of New Member States (London/ Deventer/ Alphen aan den Rijn, 1977), pp. 382-383.

and in solving vital world problems, but only to the extent in which scientific contributions can remain focused upon the present situation. He similarly based his denouncement of scientific involvement in utopian designs upon the narrow supposition that scientific efforts ought always to be restricted to analyses of presently existing facts - a view which in my opinion underestimates the function of scientists with regard to purposeful future planning.

When one considers the future, one must evidently give account of present predicaments and their reasonable propensities, but one ought also to reflect upon the calculated conditions for avoiding the expected catastrophes which would become unavoidable if, in [261] a spirit of either contentment or fatalism, present tendencies were to be permitted to take their course. I, for one, would not want to spend my mental energies on deliberations that could not at least inspire attempts of, *inter alia*, sociological, juridical, political, and economic entrepreneurs to intervene in the passage of history with a view to preventing what as the hand of *laissez faire* determinists would become the inevitable. Though empirical evaluations of the past and present must always be based on the IS of the relevant situation, all truly useful exercises in futurology must concern itself with the OUGHTS of tomorrow. Prognostic treatment of the future is, admittedly, bound to be inaccurate, for as time moves on it seems to accelerate beyond the limits of human comprehension and tends to belie even our most evident expectations. One can, therefore, but evaluate the present tendencies, regard the continuity of historical patterns, and, in the end, take a long shot in the dark. Academic intelligentsiae nevertheless, not to avoid their responsibilities with regard to future developments under the pretences of a narrow-minded positivistic concept of the domain of science.

One must, however, guard against the relentless idealism of obsessed fanatics. Mr Dooley defined a fanatic as someone who does what he believes "th' Lord wud do if he only knew the facts in th' case"³²; and an American historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., referred to fanaticism as "the willingness to sacrifice human beings to abstraction".³³ The problem with the involvement of scientists in the quest for ideal models is accordingly, in

³² (16) Mr Dooley is a fictitious but very real Irish saloon-keeper, created by the American humorist, Finley Peter Dunne (1867-1936), whose sketches were published in **Mr Dooley in Peace and War** (1898) and in various subsequent collections.

my opinion, not so much to be found in self-imposed limitations of science as such, but would appear if academics were to associate themselves with the total disregard of human dignity by unscrupulous patrons of over-ambitious goals.

Nor ought one in this regard to concede such sophistry as that the end justifies the means. The compatibility of one's ultimate aims with moral values always seems to be dubious, whereas the medium which one intends to employ to achieve those objectives is almost invariably and unquestionably objectionable. The celebrated American Supreme Court judge, Louis D Brandeis (1856-1941), expressed the same view in the following terms: "One can never be sure of ends - political, social, economic. *There* there must always be doubt and difference of opinion ... There is not the same margin of doubt as to *means*. Here fundamentals do not change; centuries of thought have established standards. Lying and sneaking are always *bad*, no matter what the ends."³⁴ Endeavours to justify the use of downright reprehensible means for the sake of highly disputable aims accordingly commence with an almost insurmountable handicap.

In the present context I wish to point out that Utopianism - that is, the belief that human society shall in the distant future reach a stage of perfection when the need for social reform will cease to exist - contradicts Christian teaching, whereby human society [262] has been doomed to everlasting imperfection resulting from man's sin and natural sinfulness, and whereby man is called upon to seek his final destiny beyond the temporal structure of our earthly existence. But the Scriptural incompatibility of the idea of a heaven on earth ought not to prevent Christians from seeking a better life. God, in fact, instructed man to subdue the earth and rule over all living things (Genesis 1:28), and He bestowed upon man excellent talents for the purpose of combating the consequences of sin and of improving the world we live in.

As far as models are concerned I should add in conclusion that to me the international economic order envisaged by Dr. Goudzwaard appears to be exactly such an idealistic design for the future, and - if I am correct - it would therefore seem that our

³³ (17) "The Lessons of History", in H. Ober Hess, ed., **The Nature of Humane Society: A Symposium on the Bicentennial of the United States of America** (Philadelphia, 1976), p. 33.

³⁴ (18) Quoted in A. T. Mason **Brandeis: A Free Man's Life** (1956) p. 569 (my emphasis).

speaker has fallen into the trap of his own theoretical postulate regarding the permissible ambit of scientific actions.

I could, on the other hand, find complete peace with Dr. Goudzwaard's assumption that (*inter alia*) social, political, and economic scientists ought always to concern themselves with so-called "norms". I do, however, have a problem with his choice of terminology in this regard. I would prefer to reserve the word "norm" for those modal laws that govern the normative side of reality and which have already been positivated by the appropriate law-making authority.³⁵ Norms derive their validity, contents, and moral justification from pre-existing *principles*, which in turn have been instituted by God as an essential ingredient of the order of creation. Dr. Goudzwaard's "norms" ought in my opinion accordingly to be called "principles".

Be that as it may, I do share Dr. Goudzwaard's belief that scientific activities ought to include a search for and analysis of the basic principles that underlie the aspect of reality concerned, and that scientists ought also in the appropriate cases to promote the preservation or reinstatement of those principles that have gone astray on account of the imperfections resulting from the fall of man.

3. Justice

Dr. Goudzwaard has deduced the 'norms' which in his opinion ought to govern the international economic order from three basic principles, that is the economic principle of stewardship or accountability, the juridical principle of justice, and the social principle of cooperation and participation. I shall confine my comment in this regard to a few generalities regarding the principle of justice only.

Ever since Aristotle, in the fourth century BC, presented Western culture with the

³⁵ (19) Law in the wide sense can be subdivided in (a) the central Biblical command, which requires of man to love his neighbor and to love God above all other things; (b) structural laws, which determine the essential nature of things, social entities, and occurrences; and (c) modal laws, which apply to the functioning of things and social entities within temporal reality. Modal laws can again be subdivided into (a) natural laws, that is laws which operate *per se*; and (b) norms, that is laws which become valid only after they have been positivated by an authority with the competency to do so. Norms in this sense include the analytical, historical, linguistic, social, economic, aesthetical, juridical, ethical, and religious laws.

first truly scientific exposition of the concept of justice,³⁶ it has been generally accepted that this fundamental directive of the legal idea requires the equal treatment by and before the law of the subordinates of a particular legal order.

Whereas (commutative) justice in private law relations requires [263] a strict arithmetical equality - that is, an equality which ignores the subjective attributes of the persons concerned - between, for instance, performance and counter-performance in contracts and between harm and damages or injury and reward in delicts, distributive justice which governs the allocation by state authority of, for instance, the rights and obligations of different groups of state subjects, entails the principle of geometrical equality which can perhaps be described as an equality based upon the inequality of the subjects concerned. In his **Nicomachean Ethics**³⁷ Aristotle summarized the gist of his notion of distributive justice in the following terms: "And there must be the same 'equality' (i.e. the same ratio) between the persons and the things: as the things are to one another, so must the persons be. For if the persons be not equal, their shares will not be equal; and this is the source of disputes and accusations, when persons who are not equal receive equal shares". This simply means that the subjects of the state must receive whatever state authority has to offer "according to merit"³⁸ or in the words of Wolfgang Friedmann's paraphrase of the Aristotelian concept of distributive justice, that equals ought to be treated equally and unequals unequally.³⁹

Aristotle was careful to emphasize that not every subjective quality of the persons involved is to be taken into account when applying the principle of distributive justice. he suggested a teleological approach in this regard: the *purpose* of the distribution must serve as the criterion for distinguishing the relevant from the irrelevant personal attributes.

³⁶ (20) For a more detailed analysis of the Aristotelian concept of justice, cf, for instance, M Salmon, **Der Begriff der Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles** (Leiden 1937); P. Trude, **Der Begriff der Gerechtigkeit in der aristotelischen Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie** (Berlin 1955); H. Dooyeweerd, "Een Nieuwe Studie over het Aristotelisch Begrip der Gerechtigkeit", in *Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis* (1958), p. 3; J. D. van der Vyver, "Die Regsleer van Aristoteles (384-322 vC): 'n Probleem-stelling", in *Koers* (1962), p. 224.

³⁷ (21) F. H. Peters trans., **The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle**, 10th ed (London 1906), 5 3 6 (p..145)

³⁸ (22) *ibid* 5 3 7

³⁹ Wolfgang Friedmann, **Legal Theory** (New York, 1967), p. 21.

Applying these principles to the international economic order presents serious problems. The Aristotelian concept of distributive justice was designed as an ideal formula for dealing with the relations between state authority and state subjects within the context of national jurisdictions, and I have reasonable clarity in my own mind as to the application of the principle of justice in the traditional Aristotelian sense to the granting of rights and obligations to the legal subjects within a particular national juridical order.⁴⁰ But where the subject who qualify for the distribution of (*inter alia*) economic wealth are the national entities of the world, the problem becomes more complex. My great difficulty in this regard is to find a basis for determining the relevant *merits* of the various national entities. One cannot simply regard those national entities as equal units in the arithmetical sense, for the very notion of distributive justice presupposes, and is based upon, the factual inequality of the involved subjects. How, then, are those varying attributes of national states that would warrant their respective claims to a particular portion of the riches of our globe to be assessed?

Dr. Goudzwaard has sought guidance in this regard from certain Biblical principles, which I find of little avail since they again apply to human subjects who reflect the image of God and whose individual merits can be identified in view of fairly evident personal [264] qualities and needs. I do not wish to be understood as having suggested that Scriptural directives could not all cast light upon our present problem; I am, however, saying that Dr. Goudzwaard has to some extent oversimplified the idea of justice that ought to govern the distribution of economic goods within an international context.

4. The South African Lesson

For in his excellent analysis of the problems facing the world of tomorrow with regard to a more equitable distribution of wealth, Dr Goudzwaard has highlighted several extremely important negative side-effects of existing international aid programs., such as the reluctance of privileged societies to really make sacrifices that would curtail their own abundance, the paternalistic approach of international do-gooders, and - perhaps worst of all - the manifestation of neo-colonialism resulting from the increasing economic

⁴⁰ Cf. for instance, J. D. van der Vyver **Seven Lectures on Human Rights** pp. 1-20.

dependence of Third World countries upon influences and unseen forces engendered by excessive foreign investments.

There is also merit in Dr. Goudzwaard's final assumption that problems related to the pluralistic composition of the South African population may serve as an indication of the type of challenges that would confront the architects of an international economic order. The South Africa experience has certainly demonstrated the fallacy of the supposition that the preservation of cultural identities can be enforced by means of legislative compulsion, but I am, on the other hand, not at all convinced that ethnic peculiarities will necessarily disappear in the face of a system of economic integration.

Nor ought one, in my opinion, to pursue a course aimed at the elimination of cultural diversities, international economic cooperation is certainly not dependent upon ethnic homogeneity; and one may in this regard again be reminded of the history of those ancient people who upon a plain in the land of Shinar built a tower with its top in the heavens

Norms for the International Economic Order

(A Response)

James Skillen

from *Justice in the International Economic Order* 1978 pp. 268-271.

This paper by Professors Goudzwaard and van Baars is so thorough, careful, probing, suggestive, and helpful that I cannot find a sufficiently critical way to approach it. Allow me, in the first place then, to emphasize briefly some of its most important points.

Approaching international economic life from a normative, biblical perspective is radically different from approaching it from a secularised positivistic standpoint. The secular positivist may indeed be interested in human "values", "goals", and "trends", but his perspective will not allow for heteronomous norms. It is not simply that Goudzwaard and van Baars have come to the field of commonly shared economic facts with their own peculiar "values" or "goals". To the contrary, the openness toward God-given economic norms means that right from the start their entire conception of economic life takes shape differently. Among the many insights that this approach provides is the extremely valuable observation made toward the end of the paper: "Thinking from the perspective of *norms* creates the greatest certainty concerning the steps which ought to be made at the *beginning*: the thinking from the perspective of future goals renders precisely those first steps which ought to be taken uncertain".⁴¹ That statement alone is of great *practical* significance for scholars, multinational corporations, and governments.

A second important contribution of this paper that must not be overlooked is its emphasis on political-economic-social norms in their interrelationship. International economic justice is a matter of public justice and involves the responsibility of states and international organizations. International economic justice is not simply the concern of business enterprises and international commercial organizations. Taking up the challenge to do economic justice in the world means that we cannot avoid questions about the nature

⁴¹ This slightly amends what appears on p.247 of the original (p. 33 [247] above): "Thinking from the perspective of *norms* creates the greatest certainty concerning the steps which ought to be made at

and responsibility of states, about international and trans-national organizations, and about the requirements of global justice that may require less national autonomy and more state interdependence and cooperation.

At this juncture, however, it seems to me that Goudzwaard and van Baars have not said enough to help us clarify the differences between (and the proper relationships among) economic, juridical, and social norms. They have woven together quite beautifully some economic, juridical and social norms in order to point the way for governments and international political organizations to take [269] if greater justice is to be achieved. But their remarks seem to me to be less helpful as guides for business and commercial organizations, especially major multinational corporations, and less helpful for ecclesiastical, academic, and other non-public institutions in the present unjust international situation.

However, despite my limited dissatisfaction I am convinced that the paper can stand on its own feet. It is broad and powerful and coherent. It confronts us as a substantial challenge to pursue Christian economic and political research on a grand scale and to work for greater justice in the world.

Given the context and purpose of this conference I want to direct my main comments to a somewhat different matter. Goudzwaard and van Baars, it seems to me, are forcing us to ask the following question: "What should we do as Christian institutions of higher learning to promote a deeper, more correct, more biblical understanding of norms for the international economic order?" Let me try to respond to that question.

One of the greatest needs that students in contemporary Christian colleges and universities is for training in how to think normatively - training in how to make mature judgments about political and economic life. From the time when the social sciences began to break away from moral philosophy in the curricula of the universities a century or more ago, they also began to leave behind the concern and responsibility for training students in normative thinking. Goudzwaard's and van Baars' discussion of such key terms as

the *beginning*: the thinking from the perspective of future goals renders uncertain precisely those first steps which ought to be taken."

stewardship, justice, emancipation, equity, cooperation, and participation is carried on in a way that is foreign to many if not most university-trained economists and political scientists today. For the group of colleges and universities represented at this conference, that fact should be a challenge which receives a response. Even to be able to agree or disagree with the authors of this paper we would have to be able to enter the debate about economic, political, and social norms. How many of us, how many of our students are trained to do this? What can we do to nurture the growth of normative social thinking in our institutions?

I raise this question not in order to berate us (especially North Americans) for our inadequacies as Christian educational institutions, but rather because the clarity and depth of this paper gives me great hope and encouragement as a Christian political scientist. I want and need more of this kind of work to help me in my teaching. If, in spite of our relative institutional weaknesses and inadequacies in the areas of normative economic and political theory, we can nevertheless receive a paper of such high quality at this conference, then surely we should try to find some way(s) to move further along these lines in the training of ourselves and our students.

Thus, for the purpose of our discussion here I would like to make [270] the following proposal for a cooperative international research project that could be undertaken by three or more of our institutions.

First of all, let the several cooperating institutions select a team of economists, political scientists, and others who would be able to carry out a cooperative project on one or more key problems in international economic relations.

Secondly, establish an initial period of one or two years during which the team would design a project in sufficient detail that all interested institutions represented here could examine it and comment on its usefulness and helpfulness for their institutional needs. After review and redrafting the project would be undertaken for a period (and at a cost) to be established by the cooperating institutions.

Thirdly, the project would be designed to achieve most, if not all, of the following purposes:

(a) One of the primary concerns would be to show how normative thinking is different from the methods of expedient rationality, goal setting, and modelling. A substantial part of the writing would be a careful exposition of the process of normative thinking in the social sciences and a critique of other approaches in a step-by-step fashion that would be pedagogically useful to other social scientists.

(b) At least two or three (but hopefully four or more) publications could be produced by this research that would demonstrate the growth and potential for further growth of international Christian wisdom and understanding. We Christians are also caught in our own nationalistic parochialism, in our own self-interested attitudes, and we are not in the habit of thinking normatively about global justice. If we do not begin to study and think together about international problems from an international perspective, we will have nothing with which to confront the "World Order Models Project" and other groups of scholars who are studying global affairs and shaping the minds of today's young scholars.

(c) A project of this type would be one of the most tangible ways in which we could contribute to the scholarly debates of our time. The fact of a conference such as this will mean little if anything to educational institutions on the outside. Even the publication of lectures given at this conference will not likely attract the attention and consideration of other academics. But if we could publish a number of articles and several books that dealt directly with certain key economic and political problems of our day - [271] - publications that would offer a distinctive approach and perspective and that would engage prominent contemporary scholarship, we would be able to demonstrate in a small but public way the vitality of cooperative, international Christian scholarship and the importance of Christian educational institutions in the world today. God has richly blessed us in ways that we do not fully appreciate. We should not hide our lights under baskets.

(d) Finally, such a project could make a direct contribution to the thinking and the work of statesmen and other people with responsibilities in international economic and political life. Though we, as educational institutions, do not bear the primary responsibility for promoting international justice, we cannot overlook our important secondary responsibilities. We must do more than talk about justice at conferences. We can contribute something significant for the sake of justice if we consciously aim in that direction.

I hope that in face of the many problems and tensions that we face here this week, we will not allow those problems to overwhelm us or to keep us from pursuing important deeds of cooperative service which are possible with God's help. Goudzwaard and van Baars have laid something of great value on our table. Can we not respond to their contribution with more than a few questions and criticisms, initiating what could become the first of many international Christian academic projects?